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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on choice of court agreements in international civil and
commercial law. It introduces the terminology regarding choice of court agreements,
describes different types of choice of court agreements, and examines the scopes of choice
of court agreements in Chapter 2. Based on the principle of party autonomy, choice of
court agreements have been an important basis of jurisdiction in many legal systems. This
dissertation undertakes a detailed examination of choice of court agreements in three legal
contexts, namely, Chinese law, the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention and the
Brussels I Recast Regulation, in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 respectively. In each context, the
dissertation considers severability, applicable law, and the formal and essential validity of
choice of court agreements, and explores the situation when there is a breach of the choice
of court agreement. The 2005 Hague Convention is a great international effort to establish
harmonized jurisdiction rules on choice of court agreements. Article 25 of Brussels I
Recast is a good regional example for regulating choice of court agreements within the EU.
Chinese law and judicial practices also increasingly respect choice of court agreements
between the parties. As the UK and the EU are negotiating Brexit and China signed the
2005 Hague Convention but has not ratified it yet, finally, in Chapter 6, this dissertation
not only examines the relationship between the 2005 Hague Convention and Brussels I
Recast in terms of the UK, but also reviews the relationship between Chinese law and the
2005 Hague Convention. More importantly, this dissertation recommends some law reform
measures for the future of Chinese law, which would seek to enhance the enforcement of
choice of court agreements in the Chinese legal system.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
With the rapid development of international business, there is an increasing number of
cross-border disputes between parties from different countries. Bringing a lawsuit before a
state court is a usual way for parties to resolve their disputes. In order to achieve certainty
and predictability, many legal systems allow parties to reach an agreement on the court in
which to resolve their disputes for civil and commercial matters. Choice of court
agreements record the parties’ consent and direct the parties to an agreed court in which to
resolve their disputes. When the parties enter into choice of court agreements, they expect
greater certainty, procedural efficiency, and lower litigation cost,1 and most importantly,
that no party will breach this agreement.
Based on the principle of party autonomy, when the chosen court determines its
jurisdiction on the dispute, the first step is to decide if the choice of court agreement is
valid. If a choice of court agreement is valid, in principle, the chosen court may exercise its
jurisdiction in respect of the dispute. Only when a choice of court agreement is valid and
the chosen court has properly exercised jurisdiction, can its resulting judgment be
recognized and enforced in another state. Therefore, the validity of choice of court
agreements is an important subject for state courts to address in exercising jurisdiction as
well as in enforcing a judgment from a chosen court. If a judgment of the chosen court is
not recognized and enforced in another country where the judgment debtor has assets, the
judgment has little value.
Nowadays, the trend to support party autonomy through choice of court is witnessed not
only by individual countries, but also by international efforts, which establish harmonized
jurisdiction rules on choice of court agreements. The Convention of 30 June 2005 on
1 Zheng Sophia Tang, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in International Commercial Law (Routledge
2014) 1.
1 Introduction 15
Choice of Court Agreements (“the 2005 Hague Convention”) is the international
instrument on admitting the effectiveness of exclusive choice of court agreements among
Contracting States. Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (“Brussels I Recast”) provides uniform
jurisdiction rules for determining the validity and enforceability of choice of court
agreements within the EU. It is reasonable to predict that the importance of choice of court
agreements will continue to increase in the future. Countries are likely to further relax
national law rules on determining the validity of choice of court agreements, and judicial
cooperation will be built internationally to improve the efficiency of choice of court
agreements.2
1.2 Objective and Methodology of Thesis
Choice of court agreements, as the research objective of this thesis, are special contract
terms. They not only have contractual binding effects on contracting parties, but also have
procedural effects on jurisdiction.3 In Chapter 2, basic features of choice of court
agreements will be introduced, including relevant terminologies, different types and scopes
of choice of court agreements. Choice of court agreements can demonstrate the principle of
party autonomy which plays a vital role in maintaining the global commercial order,4 and
can influence the judicial sovereignty of a State as well. If a country accepts the view that
private parties have the right to choose a competent court, choice of court agreements will
get the full validity, enforceability, and predictability which the parties intend them to have,
thus the parties will have clearer expectations on dispute resolution. As a result, party
autonomy in choosing a court for litigation can be respected and the predictability of
dispute resolution in international commercial transactions can also be promoted. This
positive result will, in turn, facilitate parties to choose the optimal court in choice of court
agreements and to avoid unnecessary delay. When a claimant brings a lawsuit before a
2 ibid, 3.
3 ibid,13.
4 Marlene Wethmar-Lemmer, ‘Party Autonomy and International Sales Contracts’ (2011) 3 Tydskrif vir die
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 431, 431.
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state court on the basis of a choice of court agreement or before another state court in
disregard of the choice of court agreement, the primary questions for the court, chosen or
non-chosen, are deciding whether a choice of court agreement is valid (according to the
applicable law that also must be determined). Only after deciding whether or not the
agreement is valid, can the court decide if it has jurisdiction over that dispute, ultimately to
exercise or decline jurisdiction.5 Different legal systems have different approaches to
answering this question, setting various requirements or limitations on choice of court
agreements for international civil and commercial disputes.
This thesis intends to make a comparative study of the relevant rules concerning choice of
court agreements mainly in Chinese law, the 2005 Hague Convention and Brussels I Recast,
to demonstrate how to determine the validity of choice of court agreements, as well as
examining the remedies for breach of choice of court agreements. The recent development
of these three legal systems will enrich the discussion on choice of court agreements
throughout the thesis. This author has chosen the 2005 Hague Convention as a global
example and Brussels I Recast as a regional example of the regulation of choice of court
agreements. As a result, the 2005 Hague Convention and Brussels I Recast will serve as the
reference point for Chinese law in this comparative legal analysis, mainly in two capacities.
Firstly, the differences between the Convention and Brussels I Recast provide an
environment where the comparison may be effectively employed. In addition, existing
Chinese law in relation to choice of court agreements is compared to the Convention.
Through these comparisons, the author is going to make some suggestions as to Chinese
rules concerning choice of court agreements, as well as to predict the likelihood of China’s
ratifying the 2005 Hague Convention.
1.3 Outline Legal Framework
1.3.1 Chinese Law
5 Jing Long and Xiangjun Zhang, ‘Identification of Validity of Jurisdiction Agreement in Foreign Civil
Lawsuit’ (2014) 1 Journal of Beihua University (Social Sciences) 111, 111.
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Chinese law follows the civil law tradition. Chinese laws exist in legislation and the
judicial interpretations or directions of the Supreme People’s Court. Case law only has
referential value in China.6 The 1991 Chinese Civil Procedure Law is the first legislation
that recognizes the effect of choice of court agreements. It has been amended in 2007, 2012
and 2017, respectively. In the latest 2017 version of Chinese Civil Procedure Law
(“ Chinese CPL”), the provisions on jurisdiction based on choice of court agreements made
by parties have been deleted from Part IV, which is focused on international issues.
However, this does not mean that choice of court agreements will not be honoured or
enforced any more in international civil proceedings in China. The fact is that now, Article
34 of the Chinese CPL, which permits choice of court, applies universally to both domestic
and international cases in China. Also, Article 34 does not make a distinction between
exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court agreements, thus it is safe to say that the rule
can apply to both exclusive and non-exclusive choice of court agreements in both domestic
and international cases. Apart from the Chinese CPL, the validity and enforcement of
choice of court agreements have also been interpreted in some judicial interpretations
published by the Supreme People’s Court, and the latest is the “Interpretation of the
Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s
Republic of China” (“2015 Interpretation”).7 Chinese rules and judicial practices in
relation to choice of court agreements will be discussed in Chapter 3.
1.3.2 The 2005 Hague Convention
The most important worldwide convention regarding the rules regulating choice of court
agreements is the 2005 Hague Convention. It has entered into force among the Contracting
States of the EU, Mexico, Singapore, and Montenegro.8 The Convention is a significant
achievement of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (“HCCH”) for choice
of court agreements in international commercial litigation, and produces positive effects on
6 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 1) 15.
7 The 2015 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of
the People’s Republic of China <http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=82f91c0394dcdc28bdfb&lib=law>
accessed 5 September 2019.
8 Updated list of Contracting States to the 2005 Hague Convention
<https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98> accessed 5 September 2019.
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the development of international transactions. It establishes an international framework to
promote international trade and investment by encouraging judicial cooperation in the field
of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in regard to choice of
court agreements.9 The 2005 Hague Convention leads to “a full harmonization of the
Contracting States’ regulation”10 and aims to promote greater legal certainty concerning
choice of court agreements between parties in international commercial transactions. More
specifically, it seeks to make choice of court agreements more effective in different legal
systems by establishing “a coordinated regulatory framework” across all these systems.11
More details about the rules of the 2005 Hague Convention will be provided and discussed
in Chapter 4.
The People’s Republic of China, as the second largest economy in the world, signed the
2005 Hague Convention on 12 September 2017, but has not yet ratified it. This marks an
important step forward towards the global acceptance of the Convention. China’s joining
as a Contracting State to the 2005 Hague Convention is expected to lead to enhanced
certainty in settling commercial disputes arising between Chinese parties and parties of
other Contracting States.12 It is important to compare the provisions of the 2005 Hague
Convention with the corresponding rules in existing Chinese law, as well as to predict the
future of Chinese law in this area: what is the next step of ratification for China and how
will China coordinate the Convention with its national rules? The relationship between the
2005 Hague Convention and existing Chinese law will be further discussed in Chapter 6.
1.3.3 The Brussels I Recast Regulation
9 Dorothy Murray, Haitao Liu and Ronghui Li, ‘China Signs the Hague Choice of Court Convention’ (King
& Wood Mallesons, 27 September 2017)
<https://www.chinalawinsight.com/2017/09/articles/global-network/china-signs-the-hague-choice-of-court
-convention/#_ftn1> accessed 5 September 2019.
10 Johannes Landbrecht, ‘The Hague Conference on Private International Law: Shaping a Global Framework
for Party Autonomy’ (2017) 1 International Business Law Journal 35, 36.
11 ibid.
12 Dan Song, ‘Web alert - China signs The Hague Choice of Court Convention - A step towards international
judicial cooperation’ (The Standard Club, 31 January 2018)
<https://www.standard-club.com/news-and-knowledge/latest-updates/2018/01/web-alert-china-signs-the-h
ague-choice-of-court-convention-a-step-towards-international-judicial-cooperation.aspx> accessed 5
September 2019.
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Aside from international harmonization via the 2005 Hague Convention, Brussels I Recast,
as the more influential regional harmonization measure, has been a significant
development among the EU Member States. Through Brussels I Recast, the EU has
harmonized its jurisdiction rules and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
among its Member States.13 The purpose of Brussels I Recast is to achieve the goal of free
circulation of judgments in civil and commercial matters in the EU Member States.
According to Brussels I Recast, a court in an EU Member State shall exercise its
jurisdiction mainly (i.e. under the general rule) if the defender is “domiciled” in a Member
State (Article 4) or, regardless of the domicile of the defender, if the court of a Member
State has special jurisdiction (Article 7), or exclusive jurisdiction (Article 24), or
jurisdiction by parties’ choice (Article 25), or by their submission (Article 26). More
details of Article 25 concerning choice of court agreements will be provided and discussed
in Chapter 5.
Many similarities may be found between Brussels I Recast and the 2005 Hague
Convention with respect to choice of court agreements. It can also be said that the adoption
of Brussels I Recast contributed to the approval of the Convention by the EU. For the EU,
ensuring coherence as early as possible between the rules on choice of court agreements in
civil and commercial matters and the rules of the 2005 Hague Convention was a wise
decision. The relationship between the Brussels I Recast and the 2005 Hague Convention
will also be further examined in Chapter 6, including the influence of Brexit.
13 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 1) 17.
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2 Basic Features of Choice of Court Agreements
2.1 Relevant Terminology
Parties reaching an agreement in writing is the most direct form of exercise of party
autonomy. In civil and commercial matters, an agreement about jurisdiction could be a part
of the main contract between parties (contained in one clause or more clauses), or it could
be a separate (i.e. freestanding) agreement made by the parties. No matter what form the
agreement takes, different terminology is used in different instruments and materials by
different legislators and scholars. This section will introduce these terms relating to the
choice of court and make some comments, thus setting an appropriate basis for greater
discussion of choice of court agreements in later sections.
2.1.1 Choice of Court Agreements
The term “choice of court agreements” (or “choice-of-court agreements”) is used in the
2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention. Article 1(1) defines the scope of the Convention,
that is, “[t]his Convention shall apply in international cases to exclusive choice of court
agreements concluded in civil or commercial matters”. As this is an international
convention, this terminology seems to have been widely accepted on a global level. This
term is widely used by many scholars in their published books and articles, such as
Ahmed,14 Dickinson,15 and Hartley.16
The exercise of party autonomy through the choice of court is where two or more parties
agree about where litigation concerning their disputes will take place. Three basic elements
(agreement, choice and court) are contained in this terminology, which explicitly reflects
14 Mukarrum Ahmed, The Nature and Enforcement of Choice of Court Agreements: A Comparative Study,
vol 19 (Hart Publishing 2017).
15 Chapter 9 in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (Oxford University
Press 2015) 277-306.
16 Chapter 13 in Trevor C Hartley, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe: The Brussels I Regulation,
the Lugano Convention, and the Hague Choice of Court Convention (Oxford University Press 2017)
225-279.
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the parties’ autonomy. It requires firstly that there is an “agreement”, that is, there has been
a meeting of parties’ minds concluded in a formal way. If the consent of parties is absent,
there can be no choice of court agreement.17
2.1.2 Forum Selection Clause
The term “forum selection clause” (or “forum-selection clause”) is commonly used in
cases in the US. In this context, the word “forum” means “a court or, more specifically, the
system that has jurisdiction”,18 and is explained more specifically as “A court of justice
where disputes are heard and decided; a judicial tribune that hears and decides disputes; a
place of jurisdiction where remedies afforded by the law are pursued”.19 The word
“clause” means “a part of a legal document, such as a section, phrase, paragraph or
segment” in the legal dictionary.20 Thus, in the term “forum selection clause”, it seems that
“forum” equals “court” in general and “clause” refers to a certain part of the main contract,
and that part is about selecting courts for solving disputes between parties.
Historically, forum selection clauses were not favoured by American courts.21 Many courts,
whether federal or state, declined to enforce them on the grounds that forum selection
clauses were contrary to public policy and their purpose was to derogate from the
jurisdiction of the court.22 In 1972, the US Supreme Court adopted a more favourable
attitude towards forum selection clauses in the landmark case of The Bremen v Zapata
Off-Shore Co.23 From that case, if forum selection clauses are not “affected by fraud,
undue influence or overweening bargaining power”24 or the enforcement of the forum
selection clause would not “contravene strong public policy of forum in which suit is
17 Ronald A Brand and Paul M Herrup, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements:
Commentary and Documents (Cambridge University Press 2008) 40.
18 ‘Forum’ (Collins Dictionary of Law, 2006) <https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/forum>
accessed 15 July 2019.
19 ‘Forum’ (West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, 2nd edn, 2008)
<https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/forum> accessed 15 July 2019.
20 ‘Clause’ (Collins Dictionary of Law, 2006) <https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/clause>
accessed 15 July 2019.
21 Matthew J Sorensen, ‘Enforcement of Forum-Selelction Clauses in Federal Court after Atlantic Marine’
(2014) 82(6) Fordham Law Review 2521, 2529.
22 ibid.
23 The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co. 92 S.Ct. 1907 (1972).
24 ibid, 1908.
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brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision”25, they shall be given effect.
2.1.3 Jurisdiction Agreements
Section 7 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation uses the heading, “Prorogation of
Jurisdiction”. The term “agreement conferring jurisdiction” is used in Article 25. However,
European scholars, including Briggs,26 Van Claster,27 Lord Collins of Mapesbury,28
Fentiman,29 Magnus and Mankowski,30 and Torremans,31 usually use the terminology of
“jurisdiction agreements” or “agreements on jurisdiction” when referring to Article 25. In
the context of this term, the meaning of “agreement” between the parties is contractual in
nature and this kind of agreement is about the “jurisdiction” of a potential litigation.
However, the contractual agreement, which sets out the jurisdiction of a particular court,
may be regarded as “a part of procedural or public law”.32 Basically, whether a court has
jurisdiction is always a matter of public law, lying beyond the scope of party autonomy and
the direct control of private parties.33 Therefore, there are some apparent conflicts in
relation to this term and it is essential to notice the mixed legal nature (public and private)
of an agreement on choice of court.
There are some other types of jurisdiction agreements aside from choice of court
agreements, such as arbitration agreements and mediation agreements.34 According to
Tiong Min Yeo, choice of court agreements are simply about choosing the courts and
country and are the classic jurisdiction agreements for managing disputes, while other
25 ibid.
26 Para 1.13-1.18 and Chapter 6, 7, 8 in Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
(Oxford University Press 2008).
27 Section 2.2.9 in Geert Van Calster, European Private International Law (Hart Publishing 2013) 77-85.
28 Chapter 12.2 in Lord Collins of Mapesbury and others (eds), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of
Laws, vol 1 (15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2012) 599-644.
29 Chapter 2 in Richard Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (Second, Oxford University Press
2015) 48-88.
30 Ulrich Magnus and Peter Mankowski (eds), Brussels Ibis Regulation 2016, vol 1 (2nd edn, Otto Schmidt
2016) 583-669.
31 Chapter 11 & 12 in Paul Torremans (ed), Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law (15th edn,
Oxford University Press 2017).
32 Adrian Briggs (n 26) 10, para 1.17.
33 ibid.
34 Tiong Min Yeo, ‘The Contractual Basis of the Enforcement of Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Choice of
Court Agreements’ (2005) 17(1) Singapore Academy of Law Journal 306, 318.
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types of jurisdiction agreements, including arbitration agreements and mediation
agreements, also perform important roles in resolving disputes. Thus, in the context of the
term “jurisdiction agreements”, the word “jurisdiction” should not specially refer to the
choice of court by the parties.
2.1.4 Other Terms
Apart from the three main terms set out above, which are used frequently, there are some
others which appear regularly in publications. Because “forum” is broadly equivalent to
“court” and “clause” is a form of “agreement”, some scholars prefer to refer to “choice of
forum agreements”,35 “choice of forum clause”,36 “choice of court clauses”,37 or
“jurisdiction clause”,38 and so on.
2.1.5 Comments
Although all of the above terms have broadly the same meaning, in this thesis the term
“choice of court agreements” shall be used, following the example of the 2005 Hague
Convention. This phrase expresses party autonomy in choice of court explicitly, containing
the three basic elements (agreement, choice and court). On the contrary, the term “forum
selection clause” only reflects the idea of parties selecting a particular court. Similarly, the
term “jurisdiction agreement” does not show the core concept of party autonomy in choice
of court, that is, the choice of parties.
2.2 Types of Choice of Court Agreements
35 Regina Asariotis, ‘Antisuit Injunctions for Breach of a Choice of Forum Agreement: A Critical Review of
the English Approach’ (1999) 19(1) Yearbook of European Law 447.
36 Lorraine L Griffin, ‘Choice of Forum Clauses in Contractual Agreements’ (1983) 10(1) Southern
University Law Review 147.
37 Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (4th edn,
W Green 2015), para 7-41.
38 Lauren D Miller, ‘Is the Unilateral Jurisdiction Clause No Longer Option? Examining Courts’
Justifications for Upholding or Invalidating Asymmetrical or Unilateral Jurisdiction Clauses’ (2016) 51(3)
Texas International Law Journal 321; Zheng Sophia Tang, ‘Effective of Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses in
the Chinese Courts—A Pragmatic Study’ (2012) 61(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 459;
David Wilson and Joanna Silver, ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses and Anti-Suit Injunctions’ (2010) 5(4)
Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 220.
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In general, most choice of court agreements in writing have the same purpose, namely, to
confer jurisdiction on some court or to exclude some court’s jurisdiction, so that according
to the extent of exclusion, choice of court agreements may be divided into several forms.
2.2.1 Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements
Although the word “exclusive” seems to indicate that only one court can have exclusive
jurisdiction, parties usually choose the courts of one state, rather than a particular court, to
have exclusive jurisdiction on their disputes in a choice of court agreement. Thus,
exclusive choice of court agreements permit one or several courts within a single legal
system to determine disputes between the parties. According to Article 3(a) of the 2005
Hague Convention, “exclusive choice of court agreement” means that an agreement
designates one or several specific courts to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other
courts.39 For instance, parties often express exclusivity like this: “Party A shall sue Party B
and Party B shall sue Party A in the court(s) of country X, and in no other place”.40 An
agreement is “deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided
otherwise” under Article 3(b) (i.e. presumption of exclusivity), which means that the
chosen court is located in a specific country, for example, “Party A shall sue Party B and
Party B shall sue Party A in the court(s) of China”.
Non-exclusive choice of court agreements are sometimes concluded by parties in order to
avoid excluding a particular court’s jurisdiction and to easily reach consensus. This kind of
agreement confers jurisdiction on one court, but also allows each party to sue the other in
any other competent court.41 It does not exclude the jurisdiction of all other competent
courts and inevitably assumes that a lawsuit may be brought before any competent court.
The chosen court has jurisdiction in addition to the other possibly competent courts (i.e. an
additional forum).42 The parties may express non-exclusivity in writing, such as
39 Article 3 of the 2005 Hague Convention adopts the wording of “the courts of one Contracting State or one
or more specific courts of one Contracting State”, thus both one court and several courts could have
exclusive jurisdiction.
40 Ronald A Brand and Paul M Herrup (n 17) 43.
41 Richard Fentiman, ‘Unilateral Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe’ (2013) 72(1) The Cambridge Law
Journal 24, 24.
42 Jochem Vlek, ‘Lis Pendens, Choice of Court Agreements and Abuse of Law under Brussels Ibis’ (2016)
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“Litigation may be brought in the court(s) of country X, or in any other court which may
exercise jurisdiction under its own law”.43 Also, parties may designate more than one
country and there may be some restrictions, such as “Litigation shall be brought in the
court(s) of country X or in the court(s) of country Y”44 or “Litigation shall be brought by
Party A only in the court(s) of country X, and litigation shall be brought by Party B only in
the court(s) of country Y”.45
2.2.2 Asymmetric (or Asymmetrical) or Unilateral Choice of Court Agreements
Although there is an assumption that choice of court agreements may be divided into either
exclusive or non-exclusive categories, some agreements intend to contain both elements
and apply differently to each contracting party.46 These agreements are called asymmetric
choice of court agreements or unilateral choice of court agreements.47 They are usually
concluded for the benefit of one party only and provide a wider range of choice for that
party than for the other. Specifically, party A is able to sue party B in any of the chosen
courts while party B can sue Party A only in one designated court. Therefore, only the
advantaged party enjoys the choice and has the freedom to initiate proceedings before any
competent court while the other party may be able to sue in only one court.48 It is hard to
say whether asymmetric choice of court agreements are exclusive or non-exclusive in
nature. This is because, although an asymmetric choice of court agreement is
non-exclusive for party A, it is exclusive for party B. This kind of agreement usually exists
in situations where the parties have unequal bargaining power and one party is
“commercially dominant”, especially in banking and financial “transactions such as loans,
bonds or swaps”.49 In a case where there is a discreditable debtor, such agreements not
only ensure that “creditors can always litigate in a debtor’s home court, or where its assets
63(3) Netherlands International Law Review 297, 310.
43 Ronald A Brand and Paul M Herrup (n 17) 43.
44 ibid.
45 ibid, 44.
46 Mary Keyes and Brooke Adele Marshall, ‘Jurisdiction Agreements: Exclusive, Optional and
Asymmetrical’ (2015) 11(3) Journal of Private International Law 345, 364.
47 They can also be called lop-sided agreements or one-sided agreements, see para 4.190 in Adrian Briggs,
Private International Law in English Courts (Oxford University Press 2014).
48 Jochem Vlek (n 42) 310.
49 Richard Fentiman (n 41) 24.
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are located”,50 but also give creditors the flexibility of suing the debtor “in the jurisdiction
where the speediest and most effective relief is to be had”,51 thus reducing the risk to
creditors.
2.2.3 Harlequin Choice of Court Agreements
There is another type of choice of court agreement which applies differently to each
contracting party, but which is not asymmetric. This kind of agreement is called a
“harlequin clause” and has been long accepted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).52
In the case of Nikolaus Meeth v Glacetal, the parties agreed that:
If Meeth sues Glacetal the French courts alone shall have jurisdiction. If Glacetal sues
Meeth the German courts alone shall have jurisdiction.53
It can be seen from the above agreement that harlequin choice of court agreements are a
kind of non-exclusive choice of court agreement and give parties equal rights to sue the
other only in the courts of their respective country. Although the point of each party suing
in different courts makes harlequin choice of court agreements similar to asymmetric
agreements, the equal right of only having one court in which to sue the other is the point
to distinguish them. Notably, in the above case, in the ECJ’s view, harlequin choice of
court agreements are not prohibited by Article 17 of the Brussels Convention.
Consequently, Article 25 of the Brussels I Recast, as a successor to Article 17 of the
Brussels Convention, seemingly still permits harlequin choice of court agreements.
2.2.4 Non-specific Choice of Court Agreements
Non-specific choice of court agreements do not express which country’s court will have
jurisdiction. They contain “non-geographic terms” and have been approved by the ECJ.54
50 ibid.
51 Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M Carruthers (n 37) 169, para 7-44.
52 ibid, 168.
53 Case 23/78 Nikolaus Meeth v Glacetal [1978] ECR 2133, 2135.
54 Adrian Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (Oxford University Press 2014) 245, para
4.191.
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One example is the agreement in the case of Coreck Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV
and Others,55 where there was a clause stating that “the courts of the country in which the
carrier has its principal place of business” shall have jurisdiction. In this situation, the
identity of the carrier should not be in dispute and the principal place of business can be
identified without any difficulty, otherwise, it is hard to make sense of the agreement due
to the lack of clear meaning within it.
2.2.5 Hybrid Choice of Court Agreements
This type of choice of court agreement is a “combined arbitration and jurisdiction
agreement”56 and is particularly used when the agreement “incorporates an alternative
arbitration or court dispute resolution mechanism”.57 They may provide that litigation in a
particular court is the primary way of resolving parties’ disputes, with arbitration as an
alternative; or, alternatively, they may provide that arbitration is primary, with litigation as
an alternative.58
Just like asymmetrical choice of court agreements, hybrid agreements also have some
advantages. Firstly, they have more flexibility to offer different solutions in different
circumstances. In addition, such agreements also could be enforced effectively because the
widely accepted regime of the “New York Convention”59 offers easier access to enforce
the option of arbitration.60 However, such agreements combining arbitration and
jurisdiction seem to be incoherent because they cause much difficulty in distinguishing the
roles of courts and arbitration.61 Specifically, if one party exercises the right to refer the
dispute to arbitration, but the other party refers to the chosen court, which approach should
be followed and is the chosen court superior to the arbitration? In almost every country,
arbitration serves as a kind of autonomous dispute resolution meaning, but litigation in the
55 Case C-387/98 Coreck Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV and Others [2000] ECR I-9337.
56 Adrian Briggs (n 26) 137.
57 Louise Merrett, ‘The Future Enforcement of Asymmetric Jurisdiction Agreements’ (2018) 67(1)
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 37, 40.
58 Richard Fentiman (n 29) 45, para 2.13.
59 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958).
60 Richard Fentiman (n 29) 46, para 2.16.
61 Adrian Briggs (n 26) 138, para 4.55.
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domestic courts is usually the final step to solve disputes. If the litigation is superior to the
arbitration, it seems that “the reference to arbitration is optional rather than mutually
mandatory”.62 As a result, such hybrid agreements become purely jurisdiction agreements
and it becomes meaningless for the parties to agree on arbitration. Based on this reason,
there seems to be an odd logic operating within hybrid choice of court agreements. Even so,
hybrid agreements combining arbitration and jurisdiction are “mixed and matched by the
parties to produce the structure they want”,63 and they represent an autonomous way of
seeking dispute resolution by the parties.
2.3 Scope of Choice of Court Agreements
2.3.1 Temporal Scope
“Temporal scope” means the concluding time of choice of court agreements, i.e. choice of
court agreements may be concluded before or after the dispute arises, and which choice of
court agreement should be followed if the parties conclude several choice of court
agreements in different times. In civil and commercial matters, from a theoretical
perspective, any choice of court agreement could be concluded between the parties before
the substantive proceedings start in one court because of the principle of party autonomy.
The parties are free to choose any type of dispute resolution before or after a dispute arises.
It is clear that a choice of court agreement can cover both existing disputes and potential
disputes. But complex commercial transactions, especially financing transactions, often
involve several distinct contracts between the contracting parties,64 which may contain
conflicting choice of court agreements. It is necessary to assign jurisdiction to one
competent court, usually the last chosen one, from two or more inconsistent choice of court
agreements, otherwise it would be inconvenient and unpredictable for parties as well as for
those chosen courts. There is an important assumption that the parties, as “rational
commercial actors”,65 would not want the same matter to be governed by more than one
62 ibid, para 4.56.
63 ibid, 139, para 4.58.
64 Richard Fentiman (n 29) 58, para 2.55.
65 Lord Collins of Mapesbury and others (eds) (n 28) 608, para 12-109.
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agreement.66 Therefore, when there is no submission by appearance to an earlier chosen
court, it is wise to follow the last choice of court agreement to decide the jurisdiction.
2.3.2 Personal Scope
Determining who should be bound by a choice of court agreement is an important matter.
Normally, both the parties to the main contract will be bound by any choice of court
agreement contained in it.67 The situation is a little more complex when a choice of court
agreement concerns a third person. For instance, the choice of court agreement between
party A and party B is that A undertakes B to initiate a proceeding against party C only in a
chosen court.68 It is apparent that there are two questions to consider. Firstly, can a choice
of court agreement be framed like this? Then, what would happen if A sues C in a
non-chosen court? Arguably, this kind of agreement could be made as the parties are free to
agree whatever they want in civil and commercial matters, thus it represents an
undertaking made by party A to party B. In the above example, A undertakes B to sue C
only in the chosen court. In the author’s view, such an undertaking shall be interpreted as
giving rights to B rather than C because that agreement is concluded by Party A and B. If
there is no other choice of court agreement between A and C, when A brings a lawsuit
against C before a non-chosen court, B should be able to apply for a stay or dismissal of
the proceedings in order to enforce the undertaking.69 There is no obvious reason to deny
the application unless B has no “legitimate interest” in the proceedings brought against C.70
In addition, whether C could do the same in his or her own right depends on the wording of
whether A and B agree to confer the right on him or her in the choice of court agreement.
2.3.3 Material Scope
In cases in which there is no dispute about the validity (formal and essential) of a choice of
court agreement, the main question that is likely to arise is whether the dispute in question
66 Richard Fentiman (n 29) 58, para 2.55.
67 Trevor C Hartley (n 16) 273, para 13.165.
68 Lord Collins of Mapesbury and others (eds) (n 28) 609, para 12-111.
69 ibid, 610.
70 ibid.
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falls within the material scope of the choice of court agreement. Choice of court
agreements only have an effect on the disputes covered by them.
2.3.4.1 Subject Matter (Civil and Commercial Matters)
It is widely accepted that choice of court agreements may be formed in relation to civil and
commercial matters, and common perception holds that civil and commercial law is
distinct from public law.71 However, the standard distinction between these two kinds of
laws has never been fully settled, and it is never easy to distinguish civil and commercial
matters from public matters. There are also uncertainties in several other areas, such as
environmental matters, competition law, and public procurement law,72 which cannot be
readily classified into private matters or public matters.
When assessing the private or public nature of the subject matter, commercial matters
could be considered as a sub-category of civil matters,73 and the key point is to consider
whether public power is exercised. If both parties in the lawsuit are private persons
(including natural persons and legal persons), their disputed matters will always be of a
civil, private nature. If one of the parties is a public authority, or both parties are public
authorities, the subject matter depends on “whether the public authority actually uses its
public power, rather than whether the public authority acts”.74 If the dispute originates
from an act of exercising public power by the public authority, the subject matter should be
regarded as a public law matter, such as the claims for compensation or damages arising
from acts exercising public power. If the use of public power is not an issue in the dispute,
the subject matter should be regarded as a civil and commercial matter, which can be
covered by the choice of court agreement.
2.3.4.2 A Particular Legal Relationship
71 Geert Van Calster (n 27) 21.
72 ibid.
73 Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds) (n 15) 62, para 2.15.
74 ibid 63, para 2.19.
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After deciding the civil nature of disputed matters, it is usually required that a choice of
court agreement should relate to a particular legal relationship. Besides contractual claims,
the dispute between the parties could relate to some other claim as long as it is
characterized as a civil matter. Therefore, if not clearly restricted, a choice of court
agreement may cover any dispute arising from the contractual relationship between the
parties, and non-contractual claims related to the contractual relationship,75 but only this
particular contractual relationship. In Powell Duffryn v. Petereit,76 the ECJ limited the
scope of a choice of court agreement solely to a particular legal relationship, stating that
this is because the purpose of a choice of court agreement is to “avoid a party being taken
by surprise by the assignment of jurisdiction to a given forum as regards all disputes which
may arise out of its relationship with the other party to the contract and stem from a
relationship other than that in connection with which the agreement conferring jurisdiction
was made”.77
A choice of court agreement is agreed by the parties, thus only disputes stemming from
their legal relationship can fall within the scope of the choice of court agreement. The most
common situation is where the dispute stems from the main contract in which the choice of
court agreement is contained, which defines the particular legal relationship to be created
by the main contract. However, if the choice of court agreement states that it applies to “all
disputes arising out of the contract concluded by the parties”, the agreement may apply to a
legal relationship arising out of another contract between them,78 because the word
“contract” does not specify which contract and there is no reason to deny other legal
relationships. Therefore, in the author’s view, when two separate legal relationships exist
between the parties, the choice of court agreement could apply to both of them as long as it
is not clearly prohibited.
75 ibid 303, para 9.88.
76 Case C-214/89 Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit [1992] ECR I-1745.
77 ibid, para 31.
78 Trevor C Hartley (n 16) 271, para 13.159.
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3 Choice of Court Agreements in Chinese Law
3.1 Chinese Rules on Choice of Court Agreements
3.1.1 Specific Rules
In terms of choice of court agreements, it can be observed that there were two provisions in
the 1991 and 2007 Chinese Civil Procedure Law (CPL): one was for domestic disputes and
the other one was applied in international disputes. The 2012 Chinese CPL removed the
difference between domestic and international cases. At that time, some scholars argued
that this change was likely to be a preparation for the future adoption of the 2005 Hague
Choice of Court Convention.79 As expected, China signed the Convention on 12
September 2017.
The latest version of Chinese Civil Procedure Law is dated 27 June 2017 and came into
force on 1 July 2017. Article 34, which is related to choice of court agreements, stays the
same as the 2012 Chinese CPL. It does not distinguish domestic from international
disputes and also does not differentiate exclusive choice of court agreements from
non-exclusive ones. It provides that:
Parties to a dispute over a contract or any other right or interest in property may, by a
written agreement, choose the people’s court at the place of domicile of the defendant,
at the place where the contract is performed or signed, at the place of domicile of the
plaintiff, at the place where the subject matter is located or at any other place actually
connected to the dispute to have jurisdiction over the dispute, but the provisions of this
Law regarding hierarchical jurisdiction and exclusive jurisdiction shall not be
violated.80
It can be seen that parties involved in a domestic or foreign-related dispute are allowed to
79 Jie (Jeanne) Huang, ‘The Partially Modernized Chinese Conflicts System: Achievements and Challenges:
Review of Zheng Sophia Tang, Yongping Xiao, and Zhengxin Huo, Conflict of Laws in the People’s
Republic of China’ (2017) 13(3) Journal of Private International Law 633, 646.
80 Translated Article 34 of the 2017 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China
<http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=d33df017c784876fbdfb&lib=law> accessed 10 September 2019.
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choose a competent court, but the chosen court should have a substantial connection with
the dispute. In addition, quite a few courts in exact places are listed rather than just the
phrase of “substantial connection” as in the 2007 Chinese CPL. The listed places, where
the courts allowed to be chosen are located, are supposed to be actually connected to the
disputes.81 Therefore, it could be predicted in the future that, if the chosen court is located
in one of the listed places, parties shall not need to prove that the chosen court is actually
connected to their disputes (i.e. a presumption of substantial connection).
3.1.2 Status of Judicial Interpretations and Cases
Apart from codified laws, judicial interpretations, issued by the Supreme People’s Court
(SPC), are also regarded as authoritative law in China.82 Although the SPC does not have
legislative power in China,83 it can provide clear guidance to lower courts, aiming at the
encountered difficulties in judicial practice, by interpreting some provisions. As a result,
judicial interpretations have significance in Chinese judicial practice and form an
important part of Chinese laws. After the 2012 Chinese CPL came into force, the SPC
published its judicial interpretation on the CPL on 30 January 2015, which became
effective on 4 February 2015. Provisions in relation to choice of court agreements are
contained in Articles 29 to 34 and Article 531.
China follows the tradition of civil law system, so cases and judgments from one court are
not legally binding on other courts in China. However, the Supreme People’s Court is
always making efforts to publicize typical cases to guide lower courts. Since 20 January
2011, the Supreme People’s Court has publicized 112 guiding cases,84 which is a great
contribution to building a case reporting system for lower courts. In addition, since 1
January 2014, most Chinese judgments have had to be published online except in special
circumstances.85 Therefore, although cases are not regarded as formal law in China, they
81 Guangjian Tu, Private International Law in China (Springer 2016) 132.
82 Wenwen Liang, ‘Unilateral Jurisdiction Clauses under Chinese Law’ (2015) 30(6) Journal of International
Banking Law and Regulation 341, 341.
83 Mingsheng Yuan, ‘Legislationized Judicial Interpretations’ (2003) 2 Studies in Law and Business 3, 3.
84 The Supreme People’s Court of The People’s Republic of China
<http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-gengduo-77.html> accessed 10 September 2019.
85 Wenwen Liang (n 82) 341 and the website is <http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/> accessed 11 September 2019.
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can still be important references on how Chinese courts apply Chinese laws.
3.2 Severability
A choice of court agreement is different from the other provisions of a contract because it
is a conflict of laws agreement, thus should be treated differently from the other provisions.
According to the principle of severability, a choice of court agreement is independent from
the main contract. The invalidity of the main contract does not necessarily lead to the
non-existence and invalidity of a choice of court agreement.86 The 2017 Chinese CPL does
not obviously demonstrate the severability of choice of court agreements. However, the
principle of severability is authorized for dispute resolution clauses by Article 57 of the
1999 Chinese Contract Law. It provides: “if a contract is void, voidable or terminated, it
shall not affect the validity of the dispute resolution clause which independently exists in
the contract.”87 As an important type of dispute resolution clause, the severability of
choice of court agreements is widely accepted in Chinese judicial practice.
If fraud, duress, misunderstanding or unfairness make the main contract void, it will not
necessarily invalidate the choice of court agreement under the doctrine of severability,88
unless the other party proves that the choice of court agreement is also the result of fraud,
duress, misunderstanding or unfairness. In the case of Shandong Jufeng Internet Co., Ltd. v.
Korea MGame Co.,89 the SPC argued that choice of applicable law by agreement and
choice of court by agreement are two totally different legal acts and that their validity
should be decided separately according to their own relevant laws.
3.3 Applicable Law
Only after the court verifies that a choice of court agreement exists and is valid can the
86 Zheng Sophia Tang, ‘Effectiveness of Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses in the Chinese Courts—A Pragmatic
Study’ (2012) 61(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 459, 462.
87 Translated Article 57 of the 1999 Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China
<http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=21651&lib=law> accessed 11 September 2019.
88 Zheng Sophia Tang, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in International Commercial Law
(Routledge 2014) 56.
89 Supreme People’s Court, [2009] Min San Zhong Zi No. 4.
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agreement be enforced by the court. The law applicable to choice of court agreements
varies in different countries. Chinese CPL does not provide corresponding rules to decide
the law applicable to determine the existence and validity of choice of court agreements.
As a result, Chinese judicial practice demonstrates some inconsistency.
Some Chinese courts treat choice of court agreements the same as the main contracts and
apply the lex causae of the main contracts to determine the existence and validity of choice
of court agreements. In the case of The Sumitono Bank Co., Ltd. v. Xinhua Real Estate Co.,
Ltd.,90 the parties chose Hong Kong law to govern their loan agreement and conferred
non-exclusive jurisdiction on Hong Kong courts. The SPC used Hong Kong law to
interpret the meaning of the asymmetric choice of court clause in the loan agreement and
declined the jurisdiction of Chinese courts. This kind of approach is criticized because it
ignores the principle of severability. Although the severability of choice of court
agreements does not necessarily mean that choice of court agreements and main contracts
must apply different applicable laws, it is wise to treat them separately when deciding
applicable laws.
In the case of Xinhuawen International Leasing Co., Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank Guangzhou
Branch, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Singapore Branch, Development Bank of
Singapore Shanghai Branch, Commerzbank Shanghai Branch, Bank of Montreal Beijing
Branch,91 Beijing High People’s Court believed that the lex causae is only the applicable
law for the main contract. Therefore, the Hong Kong law chosen by the parties as the
governing law was irrelevant to the matter of jurisdiction and could not be used to interpret
the choice of court agreement. In the end, Chinese law was directly applied to determine
the validity of the choice of court agreement. The same approach can also be found in the
case of The Bank of East Asia Shanghai Branch, Po Sang Bank Shenzhen Branch and
China International Finance Co., Ltd. v. Shanghai Jisheng Real Estate Co., Ltd. and
Shenzhen Nanyou (Holdings) Co., Ltd.,92 in which the SPC even did not explain why
Chinese law should apply.
90 Supreme People’s Court, [1999] Jing Zhong Zi No. 194.
91 Beijing High People’s Court, [2003] Gao Min Zhong Zi No. 600.
92 Supreme People’s Court, [2001] Min Er Zhong Zi No. 154.
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Currently, most Chinese courts hold that choice of court agreements are procedural issues
and should be governed by a different law from the substantial matters. As a result, they
use the lex fori to determine the validity of choice of court agreements. In the case of
Shandong Jufeng Internet Co., Ltd. v. Korea MGame Co.,93 the validity of choice of court
agreements was classified as an issue relating to procedure to be judged exclusively by the
lex fori rather than the lex causae of the main contract. This approach has been widely
accepted by subsequent Chinese judicial practice and has become the dominant approach.94
In this way, when a lawsuit is brought before a Chinese court by the claimant, no matter
whether the parties choose a Chinese court or a foreign court in the choice of court
agreement, the seized court will decide the validity of the agreement on the basis of
Chinese law.
Applying the lex fori to assess the preliminary issues of choice of court agreements is very
quick and familiar for Chinese courts. Despite the advantage of efficiency and familiarity,
this approach is also criticized in some areas. On the one hand, the existence and validity
of choice of court agreements are not purely procedural matters.95 A choice of court
agreement stems from party autonomy and can be regarded as one contractual term. The
examination of its effectiveness is largely based on contractual concepts apart from
procedural concepts. On the other hand, if the lex fori is always applied, the validity of
choice of court agreements will depend on the country which seizes the case. This
approach would encourage forum shopping due to the various requirements of different
countries.96 For example, one court may invalidate a choice of court agreement which
would be valid under some other countries’ laws. It is likely that some parties would utilize
these strict requirements in order to escape an otherwise binding choice of court agreement.
Therefore, to some extent, applying the lex fori as the applicable law is unreasonable both
from a theoretical perspective and in judicial practice.
93 Shandong Jufeng Internet Co., Ltd. v. Korea MGame Co. (n 89).
94 Shanghai Yanliu International Transportation Co., Ltd. v. Evergreem Marine Co. (Taiwan) Ltd., Supreme
People’s Court, [2011] Min Ti Zi No. 301; Zhiming XU v. Yihua ZHANG, Supreme People’s Court, [2015]
Min Shen Zi No. 471.
95 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 86) 463.
96 ibid, 464.
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In the author’s view, choice of court agreements can be compared to arbitration agreements.
This is because both are conflict clauses, both designate the competent forum to solve
disputes and both deal with procedural matters. With regard to the applicable law of
arbitration agreements, Chinese law provides:
The parties can agree on the applicable law governing the examination of the validity
of an arbitration agreement; if the parties do not choose the applicable law but agree
on the place of arbitration, the law of the agreed place of arbitration should apply; if
the parties neither choose the applicable law nor agree on the place of arbitration or the
place of arbitration is not clearly agreed on, the lex fori shall apply.97
It can be observed that the provision excludes the application of the lex causae as the
applicable law of arbitration agreements. Therefore, in this author’s view, the parties can
also agree on the separate applicable law governing a choice of court agreement. If the
parties do not choose the applicable law for the choice of court agreement, but agree on the
chosen court, the law of the place of the chosen court shall apply to determine the validity
of the agreement. If the parties neither choose the applicable law nor agree on the chosen
court or the chosen court is not clearly agreed, the lex fori shall apply.
3.4 Formal Validity
Requirements for the formal validity of choice of court agreements vary largely from
country to country. The “written form” is the most common and standard form of contracts
in civil and commercial matters.98 It can expressly demonstrate the existence and contents
of a choice of court agreement. The black letters or words on white paper can keep an
accurate record and cannot be easily modified without any marks, so that forged
agreements can be recognized. Anything in written form can be preserved as evidence in
case the choice of court agreement needs to be proved later. Almost all countries admit
choice of court agreements that are concluded in writing. The phrase “in writing”
traditionally means that the parties write down or print their agreed choice on paper. With
97 Translated Article 16 of the 2008 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court concerning Some Issues on
the Application of the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China
<http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=c0d4cb469028a461bdfb&lib=law> accessed 11 September 2019.
98 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 88) 45.
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the development of modern technology and electronic communication, the meaning of “in
writing” has enjoyed “a relaxed extension in the international trend, including all digital
data stored in various hardware devices”.99 Apart from the flexible interpretation of “in
writing”, the concept of “written form” has currently included any form evidenced in
writing, such as oral agreements evidenced in writing.
According to Article 34 of the 2017 Chinese CPL, choice of court agreements entered in
China must be made in written form in China. However, neither the 2017 Chinese CPL nor
the 2015 Interpretation distinguishes between “in writing” and “evidenced in writing”, thus
it is unclear whether an oral choice of court agreement evidenced in writing is valid in
China. Also, neither of the two instruments lists the admitted written forms, which may
make the judicial practice in deciding the formal validity of choice of court agreements
inconsistent among Chinese courts.
With regard to the meaning of “written form”, Article 11 of the 1999 Chinese Contract
Law can be taken as a good explanation. In that article, the term “written form” refers to
“any form that can tangibly express the contents contained therein such as a written
contractual agreement, a letter, or electronic data text (including telegram, telex, fax,
electronic data exchange, and e-mail)”.100 Article 4 of the 2015 Chinese Electronic
Signature Law defines “electronic data text” as “any electronic data text that can show the
contents it specifies in material form, and can be picked up for reference and use at any
time, shall be regarded as complying with the written form prescribed by laws and
regulations.”101 It can be observed in Chinese regulations that “written form” shall refer to
documents that are concluded both in writing and by other means of communication which
can tangibly represent its content as well.102 With the development of modern technology,
the written form should not be limited to writing on paper. So long as these emerging forms
can be evidenced in writing, the purpose of preserving evidence and confirming the parties’
intention can be achieved.
99 ibid.
100 Translated Article 11 of the 1999 Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (n 87).
101 Translated Article 4 of the 2019 Electronic Signature Law of the People’s Republic of China
<http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=6f82cd6fb76141e5bdfb&lib=law> accessed 11 September 2019.
102 Guangjian Tu (n 81) 131.
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Generally, a choice of court agreement is clearly written in the main contract or separately
concluded. Although the above-expanded definition of “written form” in the 1999 Chinese
Contract Law is not formally incorporated into the 2017 Chinese CPL, some choice of
court agreements evidenced in writing have been identified as valid by Chinese courts in
judicial practice, such as fax103 and an IOU.104 Furthermore, a choice of court agreement
in a memo with both parties’ seals was identified as the basis of establishing jurisdiction in
the case of Shangyu Changfeng Motor Co., Ltd. v. Hangzhou Shengyuan Technology Co.,
Ltd.105 Similarly, in a later case, the choice of court agreement in a memo was not only
valid, but also binding on later disputes which resulted from the parties’ continuous
business transactions.106 From the discussed judicial practice in China, some Chinese
courts, in the author’s view, have made a breakthrough in deciding the formal validity of
choice of court agreements, while the phrase of “written form” could be more clearly
refined in Chinese law.
3.5 Essential Validity
3.5.1 Parties’ Consensus
Choice of court agreements are based on the doctrine of party autonomy and parties should
conclude choice of court agreements with true consensus. The 2017 Chinese CPL does not
mention parties’ consensus in choice of court agreements. According to the general
principle of contract law, defective consent can make a contract void or voidable. Similarly,
choice of court agreements should represent the authentic intention of both parties and
ought to have been negotiated fully between them rather than proposed unilaterally. The
choice of court should be the outcome of parties’ consensus so that the agreement is valid.
Choice of court agreements will be denied essential validity if parties’ consensus is
103 Hangzhou XXX Materials Industry & Trade Co., Ltd. v. Shangyu XXX Chemical Co., Ltd., Xiaoshan
District People’s Court in Hangzhou, [2012] Hang Xiao Shang Chu Zi No. 2983-2.
104 JIA v. SU, Ouhai District People’s Court in Wenzhou, [2012] Wen Ou Shang Chu Zi No. 591; Putian
Kanghua Feed Co., Ltd. v. Longfu ZHENG, Chengxiang District People’s Court in Putian, [2012] Cheng
Min Chu Zi No. 180.
105 Shaoxing Intermediate People’s Court, [2011] Zhe Shao Xia Zhong Zi No. 134.
106 Gaomi XXX Textile Printing and Dyeing Co., Ltd. v. Taizhou XXX Chemical Fiber Factory, Taizhou
Intermediate People’s Court, [2013] Tai Zhong Shang Xia Zhong Zi No. 0052.
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defective by reason of “misrepresentation, mistake, fraud, duress or undue influence”.107
In general, the existence and authenticity of parties’ consensus can be determined from the
above formal validity of choice of court agreements. If there is evidence that the parties
failed to reach consensus on the choice of court, the choice of court agreement will be void
and will not be enforced by Chinese courts. In the case of Hangzhou Liaosiankai Chemical
Co., Ltd. v. Suzhou Jiecheng Dyeing Co., Ltd.,108 the delivery note submitted by the
plaintiff was a special standard document printed unilaterally by the plaintiff. Although it
contained the words “the disputes between the supplier and the buyer arising from the
business shall be settled by the court of the supplier”, that clause had not been confirmed
by the seal or the signature of the defendant. As for the act of the defendant’s staff signing
on the delivery note, it could only show the fact that the defendant had received the
plaintiff’s goods and could not prove the fact that the choice of court clause in the delivery
note had been approved by the defendant. As a result, the choice of court clause in the
delivery note was not binding on the defendant and the court rejected its jurisdiction.
Similarly, in the case of Guolei JIANG v. Dongyang Red Star Clothing Co., Ltd.,109 there
was a clause on the code sheet saying “If there is any dispute, it shall be accepted by Zhuji
People’s Court.” The seized court regarded the code sheet as a unilateral declaration by the
claimant rather than a choice of court agreement based on both parties’ consensus.
Articles 52 and 54 of the 1999 Chinese Contract Law respectively list the situations when a
contract is void or voidable, including fraud, duress, malicious collusion, concealing illegal
purpose, damaging public interests, violating mandatory rules, serious misunderstanding,
and obvious unfairness.110 These two provisions can be referred to when examining
parties’ consensus in choice of court agreements. In terms of the above various situations,
there are only cases in Chinese judicial practice in which choice of court agreements are
invalidated for unfairness to one party and these cases mainly concern choice of court
agreements in bills of lading. The choice of court agreements in bills of lading are standard
107 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 88) 56.
108 Shangcheng District People’s Court in Hangzhou, [2010] Hang Shang Shang Chu Zi No. 434-1.
109 Shaoxing Intermediate People’s Court, [2011] Zhe Shao Xia Zhong Zi No. 37.
110 Translated Articles 52 and 54 of the 1999 Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (n 87).
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terms which are prepared in advance for general and repeated use by one party and which
are not negotiated with the other party when concluding the contract. Under Article 39 of
the 1999 Chinese Contract Law, only when the party drafting the standard contract informs
the other party in a reasonable way and makes it known to the other party can the standard
contract be valid.111 This is the requirement of “proper notice” abiding by the principle of
fairness.
As regards the requirement of “proper notice”, it seems discretionary for Chinese court. In
the case of Wenzhou Foreign Trade Co. of Light Industry Arts and Crafts v. CMA CGM
(France),112 the choice of court agreement was printed on the face of the bill of lading in
red while all other provisions were in blue. The court confirmed that the defendant had
properly notified the plaintiff with a striking color. On the contrary, in the case of Ningbo
Rida Clothing Co., Ltd. v. Japan Nohhi Logistics Co., Ltd.,113 the choice of court
agreement was printed on the back of the bill of lading and the carrier did not perform the
reasonable duty of notice. The court held that the choice of court agreement did not express
the parties’ consensus, thus was void against the principle of fairness. Similarly, it was also
held that a choice of court agreement in small English print on the left corner of a bill of
lading was not proper notice to the other party.114
3.5.2 Substantial Connection
According to Article 34 of the 2017 Chinese CPL, it can be observed that Chinese law still
insists on the principle of “substantial connection” and parties are only allowed to choose
courts that have a substantial connection with the dispute. In Article 34, five courts (i.e. the
place where the defendant is domiciled, or where the contract is performed or signed, or
where the plaintiff is domiciled, or where the subject matter is located or any other place
that has substantial connection with the dispute) are listed as qualifying courts. If the
connection between the dispute and the chosen court is too weak or even non-existent, the
111 Translated Article 39 of the 1999 Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (n 87).
112 Fujian High People’s Court, CLI.C. 21767
<http://www.chinawuliu.com.cn/xsyj/201307/25/242767.shtml> accessed 11 September 2019.
113 Ningbo Maritime Court, [2009] Yong Hai Fa Shang Chu Zi No. 255.
114 Wenwen Liang (n 82) 343.
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choice of court agreement will be invalid and the chosen court will not exercise jurisdiction.
In the case of Liqiang Zheng v. Wider Logistics Co., Ltd.,115 the choice of court agreement
in the bill of lading provided that all disputes arising from the US Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act 1936 should be brought exclusively before the US Court, and the English court
had jurisdiction in respect of other disputes. The Chinese court held that neither the US nor
the UK had a substantial connection with the dispute, thus invalidated the choice of court
agreement.
Although the chosen court is required to have a substantial connection to the dispute, it is
not clear whether other types of connections apart from the five listed places are competent
to validate choice of court agreements. Some Chinese courts only allow the parties to
choose from the five listed places, and would not consider whether there is any other
substantial connection when the chosen court is not in the five listed places.116 In fact, the
Supreme People’s Court admits there can be other substantial connection, but does not
reflect it expressly in published judicial interpretations. In the case of Shandong Jufeng
Internet Co., Ltd. v. Korea MGame Co.,117 a Chinese Internet company and a Korean
company concluded a contract, choosing the Chinese law as the applicable law and
Singaporean courts to have exclusive jurisdiction. The SPC held that:
Singapore referred to by the parties’ choice of court agreement, in this case, is neither
the place of domicile of both parties, nor the performance place or contracting place of
the contract, or the place of the subject matter. At the same time, the applicable law in
the parties’ choice of law agreement, in this case, is also not the Singaporean law. In
addition, the parties failed to prove that Singapore has other substantial connections
with the dispute.
As a result, Singapore had no substantial connection with the dispute and the choice of
court agreement was invalid. What should be noted is that one of the reasons why
Singaporean courts had no substantial connection with the dispute was that the parties
chose Chinese law instead of Singaporean law to govern their dispute. This reasoning
seems to indicate that the substantial connection can be established by the choice of law
115 Guangzhou Maritime Court, [2005] Guang Hai Fa Chu Zi No. 267.
116 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 86) 466.
117 Shandong Jufeng Internet Co., Ltd. v. Korea MGame Co. (n 89).
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agreements.118 Therefore, the applicable law of the main contract can also be used as a
criterion for deciding the “substantial connection” if it is the law of the place of the chosen
court. Specifically, if there is no choice of law agreement and the chosen court is chosen,
but has no other connection to the dispute, the chosen court has no substantial connection
to the dispute. If the applicable law of the main contract chosen by the parties is the law of
the place of the chosen court, the chosen court will have a substantial connection to the
dispute due to the fact itself that the parties choose the law of the place of the chosen court.
3.5.3 The Levels of Jurisdiction and Exclusive Jurisdiction of Chinese Courts
In determining the validity of choice of court agreements, one country may require that
agreements do not violate special provisions concerning jurisdiction in its own domestic
law. Article 34 of the 2017 Chinese CPL indicates that the Chinese law regarding the levels
of jurisdiction and exclusive jurisdiction of Chinese courts shall not be violated by parties’
choice of court agreements.
The levels of jurisdiction of Chinese courts refers to the level of a court deciding a case in
China.119 The court of original jurisdiction initially hears and decides a case. On appeal,
the case is heard by a court with appellate jurisdiction. According to Articles 17 to 20 of
the 2017 Chinese CPL, basic people’s courts generally shall have jurisdiction over civil
cases as a court of the first instance. The first instance courts for civil cases with major
international elements or a major impact are intermediate people’s courts, high people’s
courts or the Supreme People’s Court, which depend on the scope of impact of the case.120
118 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 86) 467.
119 According to the 2018 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and the 2018 Organic Law of the
People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese court system includes:
1. The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) in Beijing, which is the court of last resort for the whole People’s
Republic of China except for Hong Kong and Macau.
2. The local people’s courts, which make up the remaining three levels of the court system and consist of
“high people’s courts” at the level of the provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities;
“intermediate people’s courts” at the level of prefectures, autonomous prefectures, and municipalities; and
“basic people’s courts” at the level of autonomous counties, towns, and municipal districts.
3. The special people’s courts, which include military courts, maritime courts, intellectual property courts,
financial courts and so on.
Hong Kong and Macau have separate court systems due to their historical status as British and Portuguese
colonies respectively.
120 Translated Article 17-20 of the 2017 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (n 80).
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Generally, major international cases include any case involving a large amount in dispute, a
case with complicated situations, a case consisting of a large number of parties, and other
cases with a major impact.121
Apart from the above mentioned main rules, there are many other provisions and notices
issued by the SPC setting a more detailed structure of the levels of jurisdiction for Chinese
courts. For example, the main standard in assessing the impact of civil and commercial
cases is the value of the subject matter, varying in different provinces according to the level
of prosperity.122 Following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization,
international cases are subject to some special rules in China for the purposes of facilitating
litigation matters for the parties concerned, preventing the loss of international cases,
fostering and making full use of the judicial resources, and improving the ability in trying
international cases.123 The first instance court for international civil and commercial cases
is usually a court at a higher level because such court is assumed to be more competent.124
With regard to exclusive jurisdiction, it means that certain international civil and
commercial cases can only be seized by some domestic courts of a country. The parties
cannot exclude their jurisdiction by choice of court agreements, and other courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction. Exclusive jurisdiction is prioritized and mandatory, and specifically
reflects the various public policies of different legal systems. Generally, the degree of
connection between the dispute and the legal system concerned is taken as the standard to
determine exclusive jurisdiction in different legal systems. Real estate disputes are usually
121 Translated Article 1 of the 2015 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of the
Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China
<http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=82f91c0394dcdc28bdfb&lib=law> accessed 11 September 2019.
122 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Clarifying Relevant Matters Concerning the Standards for
Hierarchical Jurisdiction over and Centralized Handling of Foreign-related Civil and Commercial Cases of
First Instance <http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=f6b0744d27af6775bdfb&lib=law> accessed 11
September 2019;
Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Adjusting the Standards for Jurisdiction of the Higher People’s
Courts and the Intermediate People’s Courts over the Civil and Commercial Cases of First Instance
<http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=c5f91d3897ddec54bdfb&lib=law> accessed 11 September 2019.
123 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court about Strengthening the Jurisdiction of Foreign-related
Commercial Cases <http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=f2d9741ceaa807e2bdfb&lib=law> accessed 11
September 2019.
124 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Jurisdiction of Civil and
Commercial Cases Involving Foreign Elements
<http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=26d06fe14a58379abdfb&lib=law> accessed 11 September 2019.
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assumed to have the closest relationship with the country where the real estate is located,
as well as with the sovereign interests of the country. Therefore, disputes involving real
estates are usually included in the exclusive jurisdiction of most legal systems.
According to the 2017 Chinese CPL, three kinds of disputes arising from real estates,
harbour operations and inheritance shall be respectively subject to the jurisdiction of the
Chinese court at the place where the real estate is located, the court at the place where the
harbour is located, and the court at the place of domicile of the deceased upon death or at
the place where the major inheritance is located.125 Also, if the place of performance of
“contracts of Chinese-foreign joint ventures”, “contracts of Chinese-foreign cooperative
ventures” and “contracts of Chinese-foreign cooperation in exploring and exploiting
natural resources” are in China, the disputes arising from these three types of contracts
shall be seized exclusively by Chinese courts.126 The parties cannot choose foreign courts
for the above-mentioned six types of disputes.127 However, although Chinese courts have
exclusive jurisdiction on these disputes, it is not clear whether the parties can choose courts
within the territorial scope of China for these matters.
3.6 Breach of Choice of Court Agreements
Breach of choice of court agreements may happen in China when a Chinese court seised
determines the jurisdiction but the parties have chosen a foreign court. For non-exclusive
choice of court agreements, the jurisdiction of other competent courts is not excluded, thus
suing in a non-chosen Chinese court cannot be regarded as a breach of choice of court
agreement. But for exclusive choice of court agreements, due to the relatively strict
requirement of “substantial connection” in Chinese law, the plaintiff may bring a lawsuit
before a Chinese court with the purpose of invalidating an exclusive choice of court
agreement. There are no relative rules for Chinese courts to decide whether or not to
decline jurisdiction in the face of a valid exclusive choice of foreign court agreement. As a
125 Translated Article 33 of the 2017 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (n 80).
126 ibid, Article 266.
127 Translated Article 531(2) of the 2015 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of
the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (n 121).
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result, judicial practice is not uniform in China concerning this question but some positive
changes have been witnessed.
Some Chinese courts take jurisdiction in breach of a valid exclusive choice of court
agreement because the resultant foreign judgment might not be enforced in China. In the
case of Japan Nippon Kanzai Co., Ltd. v. Beijing Zhuangsheng Real Estate Co., Ltd.,128
the parties concluded an exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of the Hong Kong
Court and the Hong Kong court had given its judgment. But there was no judicial
cooperation between China Mainland and Hong Kong at that time, thus Hong Kong
judgments could not be recognized and enforced in China. In the end, the Chinese court
argued that the exclusive choice of court agreement could not prevent competent Chinese
courts from taking jurisdiction, and finally declared jurisdiction without recognizing the
judgment of the Hong Kong court. This approach led to unreasonable results that some
parties are forced to breach their choice of court agreements by bringing lawsuits directly
before the Chinese courts in order to avoid unenforceable judgments. This approach is
often criticized for the reason that “the possible result of the judgment should not be a
factor for a court to consider when determining its jurisdiction”.129
As China entered into more and more bilateral agreements with foreign countries to
recognize and enforce judgments,130 more Chinese courts began to recognize exclusive
choice of court agreements and declined jurisdiction in breach of them. If the exclusivity of
the chosen court is obviously expressed in the choice of court agreement, Chinese courts
would recognize that exclusivity and decline jurisdiction, for example, in the case of Sojitz
Co. v. Jianyu XIAO,131 Junichirou WATANABE v. Culture & Art Press,132 and May Delight
Ltd., Good Prosper Holdings Ltd., Total Fortune Investments Ltd. and Long Life
International (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. v. Fulai International (Shanghai) Co., Ltd..133
However, if the exclusivity of the chosen court is not obviously expressed in the choice of
128 Beijing High People’s Court, [2008] Gao Min Zhong Zi No. 919.
129 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 86) 476.
130 Bilateral civil judicial cooperation agreements between the People’s Republic of China and other
countries <http://www.moj.gov.cn/Department/node_358.html> accessed 11 September 2019.
131 Shanghai High People’s Court, [2004] Hu Gao Min San (Zhi) Zhong Zi No. 72.
132 Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court, [2008] Hu Yi Zhong Min Wu (Zhi) Chu Zi No. 210.
133 Shanghai High People’s Court, [2017] Hu Min Xia Zhong No. 96.
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court agreement, Chinese courts would try to find out whether the chosen court was
intended to be exclusive. For example, in the case of Standard Chartered Bank (China) Co.,
Ltd. v. Changshu Xingyu Xinxing Building Materials Co., Ltd.,134 the Chinese court argued
that exclusivity depended on whether the words used by the parties are clear. If the chosen
Taiwanese court is clearly stated in the choice of court agreement, it will be presumed to be
the exclusive court. As a result, the Chinese court did not have competent jurisdiction and
declined it. Similar reasoning can also be found in the case of Guangzhou Xingji Film Co.,
Ltd. v. Xinghao Entertainment Co., Ltd.,135 Cathay United Bank Co., Ltd. v. Chao GAO,136
Shanzheng International Securities Co., Ltd. v. Kai YANG.137 It can be seen that the
importance of party autonomy is increasingly highlighted in Chinese judicial practice when
there is a breach of valid exclusive choice of court agreement.
3.7 Conclusion
With the development of party autonomy as one of the most important principles in
modern private international law, Chinese law recognizes the validity of choice of court
agreements in international civil and commercial matters. With regard to the severability,
applicable law and formal validity of choice of court agreements, Article 34 of the 2017
Chinese CPL can generally provide certainty, predictability, and efficiency to the parties
with the supplement of other relevant rules and judicial cases. However, for the essential
validity of choice of court agreements, Chinese law sets relatively strict requirements for a
choice of court agreement to be valid. Considering the limitations and drawbacks of Article
34, some recommendations for enhancing Chinese law will be discussed and provided in
Chapter 6. For comparison, the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention, as a significant
international achievement, is going to be examined in the next chapter.
134 Jiangsu Province High People’s Court, [2010] Su Shang Wai Zhong Zi No. 0052.
135 Guangdong Province High People’s Court, [2016] Yue Min Xia Zhong No. 312.
136 Supreme People’s Court, [2017] Zui Gao Fa Min Shen No. 4205.
137 Supreme People’s Court, [2018] Zui Gao Fa Min Xia Zhong No. 28.
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4 Choice of Court Agreements in the 2005 Hague Convention
4.1 Introduction
The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was completed at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law on 30 June 2005, and entered into force within
the EU and Mexico on 1 October 2015. It has been an important source of law for both
lawyers drafting international commercial contracts and for judges involved in disputes
between international commercial parties. The 2005 Hague Convention is a milestone for
establishing jurisdiction in relation to choice of court agreements and aims to have court
judgments recognized and enforced among the Contracting States.
The 2005 Hague Convention has its origins in the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, concluded by the
Hague Conference on Private International Law on 1 February 1971. That Convention
came into force on 20 August 1979 within Cyprus and the Netherlands, but only five
countries are Contracting States so far.138 No other states deposited the approval
agreements necessary to apply the treaty. In May 1992, the negotiation of a multilateral
convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments was proposed again by the
U.S. Department of State.139 In April 2002, the ambitious worldwide project was laid aside
and the Commission I on General Affairs and Policy began to consider drafting a
convention about jurisdiction based on the parties’ agreement during the 19th session. The
more specific the topic is, the easier it is for countries to reach an agreement. The
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was finally completed in June 2005. On 30
June 2005, the Final Act was signed and the Convention became open for signature and
ratification. Mexico deposited its instrument of ratification on 26 September 2007,
becoming the first state to ratify it.140 The United States of America signed the Convention
138 List of Contracting States <https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=78>
accessed 11 September 2019.
139 Ronald A Brand and Paul M Herrup, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements:
Commentary and Documents (Cambridge University Press 2008) 6.
140 Updated list of Contracting States to the 2005 Hague Convention
4 Choice of Court Agreements in the 2005 Hague Convention 49
on 1 January 2009 but has not approved it to date.141 With the release of the official
Explanatory Report in 2013,142 the Convention was ready to be considered by other States.
The European Union and Singapore signed the 2005 Hague Convention on 1 April 2009
and 25 March 2015 respectively.143 But according to Article 31, the 2005 Hague
Convention requires the second instrument of ratification to be effective within the
Contracting States. The EU ratified the 2005 Hague Convention on 11 June 2015. As a
result, the 2005 Hague Convention entered into effect on 1 October 2015 within Mexico
and 27 of the 28 Member States of the European Union (not Denmark). Following this
development, Singapore ratified the 2005 Hague Convention on 2 June 2016 and the
Convention became effective within Singapore on 1 October 2016. Denmark accepted the
2005 Hague Convention on 30 May 2018 and the Convention became effective within
Denmark on 1 September 2018. Apart from the above states, Ukraine, the People’s
Republic of China and Montenegro signed the 2005 Hague Convention on 21 March 2016,
12 September 2017 and 5 October 2017 respectively.144 It can be seen that the Convention
is a cooperative and worldwide achievement, and has increasingly gained influence around
the world.
The 2005 Hague Convention aims at “ensuring the effectiveness of choice of court
agreements between parties to international commercial transactions”.145 In order to avoid
and manage risk, parties often try to agree in advance how disputes arising from the
transaction between them are to be settled. On the one hand, parties may choose arbitration
for resolution. On the other hand, they may agree to submit their disputes and litigate in a
designated court. According to the rules set down in the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention),
arbitration agreements in international cases are almost universally recognized and
<https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98> accessed 11 September 2019.
141 ibid.
142 Permanent Bureau of the Conference, Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (Text
adopted by the Twentieth Session), Explanatory Report by Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi (HCCH
Publications 2013) <https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl37final.pdf> accessed 11 September 2019.
143 Updated list of Contracting States to the 2005 Hague Convention (n 140).
144 ibid.
145 Hague Conference on Private International Law: Outline of the Convention
<https://assets.hcch.net/docs/89be0bce-36c7-4701-af9a-1f27be046125.pdf> accessed 11 September 2019.
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enforced.146 Although choice of court agreements are usually respected in many countries,
the recognition and enforcement of judgments is still not universal. The 2005 Hague
Convention aims to remedy this situation, thereby promoting greater legal certainty and a
more supportive environment for international trade and investment, as well as other
international civil and commercial matters.
The 2005 Hague Convention applies “in international cases to exclusive choice of court
agreements concluded in civil or commercial matters” (Article 1). This statement provides
three basic limitations on the scope of the Convention: “international cases”, “civil or
commercial matters” and, most importantly, “exclusive choice of court agreements”.
However, non-exclusive choice of court agreements may also be covered in situations
when a Contracting State declares that it will recognize and enforce judgments from the
courts designated in a non-exclusive choice of court agreement according to Article 22.
The 2005 Hague Convention sets out in Article 2 a lengthy list of excluded matters to
which it shall not apply. These exclusions indicate a compromise in the process of
negotiations and demonstrate that the Convention was drafted in a way to make it more
readily acceptable to more countries.
The 2005 Hague Convention contains three basic rules that give effect to choice of court
agreements: the chosen court must in principle hear the case (Article 5); any court not
chosen must in principle decline to hear the case (Article 6); and any judgment rendered by
the chosen court must be recognized and enforced in other Contracting States, except
where a ground for refusal applies (Articles 8 and 9).147 In general, the overriding
principle in the 2005 Hague Convention is party autonomy. Courts in a Contracting State
should respect parties’ choice of a court in another country for the settlement of disputes,
and should recognize and enforce the resulting judgments. The 2005 Hague Convention is
designed to ensure the effectiveness of exclusive choice of court agreements between
parties in commercial transactions, thereby protecting the predictability of choice of court
146 There are currently 160 Contracting Parties to the 1958 New York Convention
<https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards/status2> accessed 11
September 2019.
147 Hague Conference on Private International Law: Outline of the Convention (n 145).
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in civil and commercial relationships.
4.2 Severability
The severability of choice of court agreements refers to its separateness from the main
contract of which the choice of court clause forms part. This principle is stated in Article
3(d) of the 2005 Hague Convention:
d) an exclusive choice of court agreement that forms part of a contract shall be treated
as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. The validity of the
exclusive choice of court agreement cannot be contested solely on the ground that the
contract is not valid.148
This means that the validity of the main contract and the validity of the choice of court
agreement shall be determined separately. A challenge to the validity of the main contract
does not influence the validity of the choice of court agreement. A challenge to the validity
of the choice of court agreement must be based on matters which are related to the
agreement itself.149 The validity of a choice of court agreement must be decided
independently according to Articles 5, 6 or 9, and depends on specific circumstances and
the applicable law.150 Conversely, the validity of the main contract is determined by
national law. As a result, the choice of court agreement may be valid while the main
contract is invalidated. Likewise, the choice of court agreement may be invalid even if the
main contract is effective.
In addition, the second part of the wording of Article 3(d) might raise a further question on
the scope of severability. It only mentions the validity of choice of court agreements but
does not refer to the existence of choice of court agreements. The existence of choice of
court agreements refers to whether an agreement exists between the parties, and is an issue
that should be considered before determining the validity. The distinction between
existence and validity is frequently ignored in the legislative process and in judicial
148 Article 3(d) of the 2005 Hague Convention.
149 Adrian Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (Oxford University Press 2014) 250, para
4.203.
150 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 53, para 115.
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practice.151 It is not clear whether the word “validity” in the 2005 Hague Convention
includes the “existence” and whether the existence of the choice of court agreement can be
influenced by the existence of the main contract. Usually, the validity of choice of court
agreements can be understood according to a two-part test: formal validity and essential
validity. As a result, there are three approaches to clarify the existence and validity of
choice of court agreements: the “existence” of choice of court agreements does not fall
within the scope of either formal or essential validity; the “existence” is included in the
formal validity; the “existence” is included in the essential validity. Brand and Herrup
argue that the existence of choice of court agreements does not fall within the scope of
either validity and should be determined by the law of the forum,152 while Beaumont holds
that the existence is covered by formal validity.153 Hartley and Dogauchi do not explain
this issue in the Explanatory Report. This author agrees with the opinion of Beaumont
because the existence of choice of court agreements is usually demonstrated through a
certain form. If the requirements for formal validity are satisfied, one can say that a choice
of court agreement exists. It seems improper to argue that a choice of court agreement does
not exist when it is exactly written down in black and white. Treating “existence” as a
matter of formal validity is also an appropriate approach to ensure uniformity when
applying the 2005 Hague Convention. Arguably, the meaning of “existence” is implied in
the “validity” of Article 3(d). Thus, the severability of choice of court agreements means
that the courts should examine the existence, formal validity and essential validity of
choice of court agreements independently from the existence, formal validity and essential
validity of the main contract.154
4.3 Applicable Law
When the chosen court decides that a choice of court agreement is “null and void”, Article
5(1) of the 2005 Hague Convention requires that such a determination should be made by
151 Zheng Sophia Tang, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in International Commercial Law
(Routledge 2014) 20.
152 Ronald A Brand and Paul M Herrup (n 139) 79.
153 Paul Beaumont, ‘Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention 2005: Background, Negotiations,
Analysis and Current Status’ (2009) 5(1) Journal of Private International Law 125, 138.
154 Tena Ratković and Dora Zgrabljić Rotar, ‘Choice-of-Court Agreements under the Brussels I Regulation
(Recast)’ (2013) 9(2) Journal of Private International Law 245, 261.
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application of the law of the State of the chosen court:
(1) The court or courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of
court agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement
applies, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that State; ...155
Thus, it can be regarded that parties choose courts as well as the applicable law. This rule
means the validity of the choice of court agreement is decided by the law of that State in its
entirety, including its conflict of law rules.156 The court seized must first determine what
substantive law should be applied under its conflict of law rules, and then it can apply that
substantive law to decide whether or not the choice of court agreement is null or void.157
Under Article 5(1), the chosen court will be the court seized so that its own law will be
applied. The chosen court must hear the case in principle under the 2005 Hague
Convention. Besides special declarations based on Article 19,158 “null and void” is the
only exception for the chosen court to exercise the jurisdiction. The chosen court can
decline jurisdiction only when the choice of court agreement is “null and void” according
to its own law.
For any “non-chosen but seized” court, according to Article 6, the law of the State of the
chosen court or the law of the State of the court seized may be applied:
A court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court shall suspend or
dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies unless –
a) the agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court;
b) a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of the State of
the court seised; ...159
When one party initiates the proceedings in a non-chosen court in breach of the choice of
court agreement, the “non-chosen but seized” court is obliged to decline jurisdiction, but
155 Articles 5(1) of the 2005 Hague Convention.
156 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 55, para 125.
157 Guy S Lipe and Timothy J Tyler, ‘The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Creating
Room for Choice in International Cases’ (2010) 33(1) Houston Journal of International Law 1, 23.
158 Declarations about substantial connection will be discussed in the following part 4.5.2.
159 Articles 6 of the 2005 Hague Convention.
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there are some exceptions in Article 6.160 Under Article 6(a), the court seized is not chosen
by the parties, but it still needs to apply the law of the State of the chosen court rather than
its own national law to decide whether a choice of court agreement is “null and void”.
Therefore, Articles 5(1) and 6(a) help to ensure that the chosen court and the non-chosen
court give consistent judgments on the validity of a choice of court agreement,161 as well
as ensuring certainty and predictability.162
Article 6(b) provides that the court seized does not need to suspend or dismiss proceedings
if a party lacked the capacity to conclude the choice of court agreement under its own
national law. In addition, according to Hartley and Dogauchi, lack of capacity is taken for
granted in the grounds on which the choice of court agreement is null and void under the
law of the State of the chosen court in terms of Article 6(a).163 Therefore, both the law of
the chosen court and the law of the court seized will be applied to determine the issue of
capacity. The chosen court will apply its national law to decide the parties’ capacity, while
the seized non-chosen court can apply either the law of the chosen court or its national law
to invalidate the choice of court agreement.164 If either party lacked the capacity to
conclude contracts under either law, the choice of court agreement is null and void and the
court seized does not need to decline the jurisdiction.
4.4 Formal Validity
The formal requirements for choice of court agreements are set in Article 3(c) of the 2005
Hague Convention:
c) an exclusive choice of court agreement must be concluded or documented - i) in
writing; or ii) by any other means of communication which renders information
accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference.165
160 The obligations of a non-chosen court will be discussed further in part 4.6.
161 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 61, para 149.
162 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 151) 26.
163 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 61, para 150.
164 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 151) 33.
165 Articles 3(c) of the 2005 Hague Convention.
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If a choice of court agreement does not satisfy the above requirements, it will not be
covered by the 2005 Hague Convention. Hartley and Dogauchi explain that these two
formal requirements are “necessary and sufficient” within the Convention,166 which means
that the Contracting States cannot add further formal requirements by national law.167 In
other words, Article 3(c) of the 2005 Hague Convention is the highest standard for all
Contracting States and national law can only set less rigid formal requirements for choice
of court agreements. Thus, a choice of court agreement may be recognized as valid as to
form by a Contracting State under its national law even if it does not satisfy the formal
requirements of Article 3(c).
Under Article 3(c), when the choice of court agreement is “in writing”, it shall be
explained as referring to the direct and traditional paper form or hard copy. Other possible
forms include all “electronic means of data transmission or storage” only if the data is
accessible and can be used in the future,168 such as telegram, fax, email and so on. The
expression of “means of communication which renders information accessible so as to be
usable for subsequent reference” comes from Article 6(1) of the 1996 UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic Commerce.169 It tries to cover all communication and electronic means
of data transmission or storage, which are widely used in daily life and may continue to
emerge with the development of technology in the future. Therefore, the formal
requirements in the 2005 Hague Convention are relatively easy to satisfy, which fully
reflects the tolerant attitude to making choice of court agreements as effective as possible.
In addition, it is notable that the wording “concluded or documented in writing” is used in
Article 3(c) instead of “evidenced in writing”. Hartley and Dogauchi explain that the
provision does not constitute a rule of evidence.170 This means that an oral choice of court
agreement, which is documented later, also meets the formal requirements of the 2005
Hague Convention. If one party records and confirms the oral agreement in writing, and
166 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 53, para 110.
167 Ronald A Brand and Paul M Herrup (n 139) 45; Alex Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law
(Cambridge University Press 2018) 222.
168 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 53, para 112.
169 Trevor C Hartley, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe: The Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano
Convention, and the Hague Choice of Court Convention (Oxford University Press 2017) 263, para 13.127.
170 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 53, para 113.
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the other party does not raise an objection after knowing it, this choice of court agreement
can be recognized as satisfying the formal requirements, regardless of which party benefits
from the original oral agreement. In this kind of situation, the party who put the choice of
court agreement into writing must do so within a reasonable time and must communicate
the written document to the other party.171 Furthermore, Article 3(c) does not require a
choice of court agreement to be signed in order to be valid.172 Although the lack of parties’
signatures will make it more difficult to prove the existence of the agreement and parties’
consensus,173 whether the choice of court agreement is signed does not influence its formal
validity.
4.5 Essential Validity
With regard to the essential validity of choice of court agreements, we can summarize
some general requirements from some relevant articles in the 2005 Hague Convention.
4.5.1 Article 3
Article 3(a) in the 2005 Hague Convention is the defining article for exclusive choice of
court agreements:
a) “exclusive choice of court agreement” means an agreement concluded by two or
more parties that meets the requirements of paragraph c) and designates, for the
purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a
particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or one or more
specific courts of one Contracting State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other
courts.174
It can be seen that there are four requirements for choice of court agreements in Article
3(a). Firstly, two or more parties must reach consensus and there must be an agreement.
This means that the choice of court agreement should be based on a meeting of minds
171 Trevor C Hartley (n 169) 264, para 13.131.
172 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 151) 50.
173 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 53, para 112.
174 Articles 3(a) of the 2005 Hague Convention.
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because it cannot be established unilaterally.175 There simply can be no choice of court
agreement if consensus between the parties is absent.176 For example, if the choice of court
agreement is made by one party but the other party has no reasonable opportunity to check
it, there will be no consensus between them and the 2005 Hague Convention will not apply.
Furthermore, lack of parties’ signatures may influence the proof of consensus while it is
not necessary for the formal requirements, as discussed above.
Secondly, the agreement must exclude the jurisdiction of any other court. This requires the
parties’ choice to be exclusive and the chosen court or courts of one State to have exclusive
jurisdiction.177 This requirement is related to the following Article 3(b), which defines the
implied exclusivity.
Thirdly, the chosen court or courts should be in one Contracting State. Choice of court
agreements designating the courts of a non-Contracting State will not be covered by the
2005 Hague Convention.178 No matter how many courts are designated in a choice of
court agreement, they must locate in one Contracting State. The agreement, in which
several chosen courts are in different States, will be regarded as non-exclusive and will not
be covered by the 2005 Hague Convention.179 According to the wording of Article 3,
parties can designate the courts of one State, for example, “the courts of State X”, without
specifying which court in State X. Parties can also choose a particular court in State X as
well as two or more specific courts in State X, for example, “the court of Y or the court of
Z” (Y and Z are cities of State X).
Finally, parties’ disputes in relation to the choice, whether current or future disputes,
should be in connection with a particular legal relationship. Generally, choice of court
agreements concern contractual claims. But non-contractual claims, for example, tort
claims, can also be covered if they arise out of a particular legal relationship. However, it is
possible for the parties to agree that their choice of court agreement only applies to certain
175 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 49, para 94.
176 Ronald A Brand and Paul M Herrup (n 139) 40.
177 Examples of exclusive choice of court agreements are in part 2.2.1.
178 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 51, para 100.
179 ibid, para 104.
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types of disputes,180 thus, whether non-contractual claims are covered would depend on
the specific terms of the agreement in particular cases.181
As a further regulation of exclusivity, Article 3(b) defines the implied exclusivity of choice
of court agreements and provides:
b) a choice of court agreement which designates the courts of one Contracting State or
one or more specific courts of one Contracting State shall be deemed to be exclusive
unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise.182
There is a presumption of exclusivity of the chosen court in Article 3(b). If the parties wish
a choice of court agreement to be non-exclusive, they will have to say so explicitly in the
choice of court agreement.183
4.5.2 Article 19
The chosen court should exercise jurisdiction in principle under the 2005 Hague
Convention unless the choice of court agreement is null or void according to its own law.
Article 19 provides another exception to the exercise of the jurisdiction by the chosen
court:
A State may declare that its courts may refuse to determine disputes to which an
exclusive choice of court agreement applies if, except for the location of the chosen
court, there is no connection between that State and the parties or the dispute.184
This declaration of limiting jurisdiction is optional for all Contracting States. In practice,
parties may choose the courts of a neutral State which has no connection to either party or
the dispute. Both parties may feel that they may be treated unfairly before the courts of the
other party’s State. Some countries welcome this kind of choice, while others argue that it
180 Ronald A Brand and Paul M Herrup (n 139) 44-45.
181 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 51, para 101.
182 Articles 3(b) of the 2005 Hague Convention.
183 Ronald A Brand and Paul M Herrup (n 139) 42.
184 Articles 19 of the 2005 Hague Convention.
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will impose an undue burden on their judicial systems.185 Article 19 is necessary where
some Contracting States do not want to give up the requirement of “substantial
connection” in their national law. Furthermore, it is noted that the 2005 Hague Convention
uses the wording of “may refuse” so that the courts still have the discretion to exercise
jurisdiction even if the Contracting State makes such a declaration.186 At the same time,
national legislation could further specify under what situation there would no connection
between the State and the parties or the dispute.
In addition, according to Article 28 of the 2005 Hague Convention, a State can make a
declaration under Article 19 for only a part of its State if it is a non-unified legal system.
For example, the People’s Republic of China, containing four legal regions, may ratify the
Convention and only make the declaration for the mainland in the future.187 However, no
party to the 2005 Hague Convention has made a declaration under Article 19 so far.188
4.6 Breach of Choice of Court Agreements
Most of the above discussion concerns how the chosen court determines the validity of a
choice of court agreement. The 2005 Hague Convention requires the chosen court to
exercise jurisdiction because the exclusive character of choice of court agreements should
be respected.189 For this reason, when the parties bring proceedings before a non-chosen
court in breach of the choice of court agreement, the court seized should not hear the case.
Article 6 of the 2005 Hague Convention requires non-chosen courts to suspend or dismiss
proceedings (even if they have jurisdiction under their own national law), except in defined
circumstances:
A court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court shall suspend or
dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies unless –
a) the agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court;
b) a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of the State of
185 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 81, para 230.
186 ibid, para 229.
187 Paul Beaumont (n 153) 149.
188 Updated list of Contracting States to the 2005 Hague Convention (n 140).
189 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 59, para 141.
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the court seised;
c) giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or would be
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the court seised;
d) for exceptional reasons beyond the control of the parties, the agreement cannot
reasonably be performed; or
e) the chosen court has decided not to hear the case.190
When one of the exceptions applies, the “non-chosen but seized” court does not need to
suspend or dismiss its proceedings. The court seized does not have to hear the case,191 and
it can decide whether or not to continue its proceedings according to its national law. The
first two exceptions are concerned with the law applicable to choice of court agreements
and have been discussed above.192 The third exception “manifest injustice and public
policy” is another situation where the court seized can apply its own national law. The
“manifest injustice” usually exists where the choice of court agreement is concluded in
some unfair circumstances or where one party will receive unfair treatment before the
chosen court. For example, one party has a stronger bargaining power than the other. The
standards of injustice can be set by the law of the court seized and the reasons of injustice
should be reasonable. In addition, “public policy” usually refers to some basic principles or
mandatory rules of the State of the court seized. The distinction between “manifest
injustice” and “public policy” is that the concept of “manifest injustice” is concerned with
the interests of a particular individual, while the concept of “public policy” deals with the
interests of the public at large.193 The concept of “manifest injustice” may be included in
the concept of “public policy” in some legal systems, but either standard needs to be
satisfied when the court seized needs to exercise jurisdiction according to its national law.
Therefore, this exception does not permit the court seized to disregard the choice of court
agreement only because the agreement would be invalid under its domestic law.194 When
the agreement is null or void but does not lead to manifest injustice or violate public policy,
this exception cannot be applied and the court seized shall still suspend or dismiss its
proceedings.
190 Articles 6 of the 2005 Hague Convention.
191 Trevor C Hartley (n 169) 279, para 193.
192 See above part 4.3.
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The fourth exception “incapable of performance” mainly refers to the doctrine of change of
circumstances in contract law. It means that it is unreasonable, even impossible, to perform
the choice of court agreement due to some difficulties in some exceptional situations that
the parties cannot control. Hartley and Dogauchi give two examples for this exception in
the Explanatory Report. One example is that the chosen court no longer exists or that it
cannot be regarded as the original chosen court.195 The other example is that there is a war
in the concerned State and its courts are not functioning.196 Apart from these two situations,
other objective circumstances, where the choice of court agreement cannot be performed
reasonably, can also be considered for this exception, such as natural disasters, unforeseen
accidents, a major change of domestic law, national policy or social environment and so on.
Brand and Herrup summarize those possible situations into three categories: legal
impossibility, functional impossibility, and fundamental transformation.197 Finally, the
fifth exception is when the case will not be heard by the chosen court. Hartley and
Dogauchi argue that the purpose of this exception is to avoid “denial of justice”.198 After
all, once the dispute arises between the parties, it is better to have some court hear the case
than that no court will accept jurisdiction.
To summarise, when one party breaches the choice of court agreement and sues in a
non-chosen court, the court seized is permitted to continue its proceedings if one of the five
exceptions in Article 6 applies. If no exception applies, any non-chosen court seized is
required to suspend or dismiss its proceedings even if there are no proceedings pending in
the chosen court. If parallel proceedings are already pending in the chosen court, the
non-chosen court must at least suspend its own proceedings, and can also dismiss.199 In
general, the five exceptions would cover most of the circumstances in which choice of
court agreements may not be enforced.200 It can be seen that the exceptions to review by
the non-chosen court are more than those by the chosen court. In this way, the 2005 Hague
195 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 62-63, para 154.
196 ibid.
197 Ronald A Brand and Paul M Herrup (n 139) 94.
198 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 142) 63, para 155.
199 Matthias Weller, ‘Choice of Court Agreements under Brussels Ia and under the Hague Convention:
Coherences and Clashes’ (2017) 13(1) Journal of Private International Law 91, 111.
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4 Choice of Court Agreements in the 2005 Hague Convention 62
Convention tries its best to reduce the risk of parallel proceedings.201
4.7 Conclusion
As the most important international achievement concerning choice of court agreements so
far, the 2005 Hague Convention comprehensively deals with the obligations of the chosen
court and of the court seized rather than giving direct requirements for the validity of
choice of court agreements. With regard to the severability, applicable law, formal validity
and essential validity of choice of court agreements, the requirements can be summarized
from those regulated obligations when deciding the validity of choice of court agreements
and have been fully interpreted in the official explanatory report. In general, the 2005
Hague Convention is a valuable example to deal with choice of court agreements in
international civil and commercial matters and will certainly attract more countries to
accede. After China’s signing the 2005 Hague Convention, the China’s attitude to
ratification of the Convention will be further discussed from China’s perspective in
Chapter 6. For comparison, rules concerning choice of court agreements in the Brussels I
Recast Regulation are going to be examined in the next chapter.
201 Matthias Weller (n 199) 111.
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5 Choice of Court Agreements in the Brussels I Recast Regulation
5.1 Introduction of Brussels I Recast
There is extensive cooperation among EU Member States on jurisdiction and recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial cases. Regulation (EU) No
1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters (recast) (Brussels I Recast)202 has applied in 27 of the 28 Member States of the
European Union since January 10, 2015. It replaced Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001
of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters (Brussels I Regulation),203 which became effective in Europe
in March 2002. With regard to the origins of Brussels I Recast, the European Community
created its own framework for both jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in 1968. The 1968 Brussels Convention204 and the following Brussels I
Regulation aimed to provide uniformity in both jurisdiction and judgment recognition and
enforcement. The structure of Brussels I Recast is largely similar to those provisions and
contains the same core principles.205
The rules concerning choice of court agreements are mainly the provisions of Article 25,
located in Section 7 “Prorogation of jurisdiction” of Brussels I Recast. It provides:
1. If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a
Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or
which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those
courts shall have jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void as to its
202 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ
L 351/1.
203 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2000] OJ L 12/1.
204 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters [1972] OJ L 299/32.
205 Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (Oxford University Press 2015)
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substantive validity under the law of that Member State. Such jurisdiction shall be
exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise. The agreement conferring
jurisdiction shall be either:
(a) in writing or evidenced in writing;
(b) in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established between
themselves; or
(c) in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which
the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is
widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved
in the particular trade or commerce concerned.
2. Any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the
agreement shall be equivalent to ‘writing’.
3. The court or courts of a Member State on which a trust instrument has conferred
jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdiction in any proceedings brought against a
settlor, trustee or beneficiary, if relations between those persons or their rights or
obligations under the trust are involved.
4. Agreements or provisions of a trust instrument conferring jurisdiction shall have no
legal force if they are contrary to Articles 15, 19 or 23, or if the courts whose
jurisdiction they purport to exclude have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 24.
5. An agreement conferring jurisdiction which forms part of a contract shall be treated
as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract.
The validity of the agreement conferring jurisdiction cannot be contested solely on the
ground that the contract is not valid.206
Article 25 has been adjusted in some aspects from the equivalent earlier rules, namely,
Article 17 of the 1968 Brussels Convention207 and Article 23 of Brussels I Regulation.208
206 Article 25 of Brussels I Recast.
207 The original version of Article 17 of 1968 Brussels Convention (text had been amended by Article 11 of
the 1978 Accession Convention and by Article 7 of the 1989 Accession Convention):
If the Parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State, have, by agreement in writing or
by an oral agreement evidenced in writing, agreed that a court or the courts of a Contracting State are to
have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a
particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction.
Agreements conferring jurisdiction shall have no legal force if they are contrary to the provisions of
Article 12 or 15, or if the courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude have exclusive jurisdiction by
virtue of Article 16.
If the agreement conferring jurisdiction was concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties, that party
shall retain the right to bring proceedings in any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this
Convention.
208 Article 23 of Brussels I Regulation:
1. If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Member State, have agreed that a court or the
courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction.
Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise. Such an agreement
conferring jurisdiction shall be either:
(a) in writing or evidenced in writing; or
(b) in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established between themselves; or
(c) in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which the parties are or
ought to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely known to, and regularly
observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or commerce concerned.
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The most significant change introduced by Brussels I Recast pertains to the parties’
domicile. In Article 17 of the 1968 Brussels Convention and Articles 23 of Brussels I
Regulation, it is required that one or more of the parties is domiciled in a Member State. In
Article 25.1 of Brussels I Recast, the rule concerning choice of court agreements can apply
to the parties “regardless of their domicile”, which means that the parties can be domiciled
in EU or non-EU States as long as the chosen court or courts is/are in a Member State. It is
no longer necessary that at least one party is domiciled in a Member State and the only
requirement now is that the parties designate a court of a Member State.209 The reason for
deletion of the domicile requirement is that “under the old provision it was disputed
whether the domicile requirement had to be met when the jurisdiction agreement was
concluded or when court proceedings were instituted.”210 The deletion is welcomed as a
positive change because it “covers all instances in which parties have selected the courts of
an EU Member State”.211 The domicile of the parties may change, so that there is no need
to focus on the changed domicile under a valid choice of court agreement. As a result,
comparing Article 25 with the previous article of the Brussels I Regulation, the current rule
is simpler to apply because the connection of the parties’ domicile in a Member State has
been deleted from Brussels I Recast.
Under Article 17 of the 1968 Brussels Convention and Articles 23 of Brussels I Regulation,
the chosen court shall have jurisdiction when one or more of the parties is domiciled in a
Member State, and it can exercise jurisdiction when none of the parties is domiciled in a
Member State. But for the non-chosen courts of other Member States, they shall have no
2. Any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement shall be
equivalent to “writing”.
3. Where such an agreement is concluded by parties, none of whom is domiciled in a Member State, the
courts of other Member States shall have no jurisdiction over their disputes unless the court or courts
chosen have declined jurisdiction.
4. The court or courts of a Member State on which a trust instrument has conferred jurisdiction shall have
exclusive jurisdiction in any proceedings brought against a settlor, trustee or beneficiary, if relations
between these persons or their rights or obligations under the trust are involved.
5. Agreements or provisions of a trust instrument conferring jurisdiction shall have no legal force if they
are contrary to Articles 13, 17 or 21, or if the courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude have
exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22.
209 Matthias Weller, ‘Choice of Court Agreements under Brussels Ia and under the Hague Convention:
Coherences and Clashes’ (2017) 13(1) Journal of Private International Law 91, 96.
210 Ulrich Magnus and Peter Mankowski (eds), Brussels Ibis Regulation 2016, vol 1 (2nd edn, Otto Schmidt
2016) 614, para 51.
211 Vesna Lazić and Steven Stuij (eds), Brussels Ibis Regulation: Changes and Challenges of the Renewed
Procedural Scheme (TMCAsser Press 2017) 40.
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jurisdiction unless the chosen court or courts have declined jurisdiction. However, when
the chosen court exercises jurisdiction under Article 25 of Brussels I Recast, the parties can
be from different Member States or from the same Member State other than the Member
State where the chosen court is located, or from a third state (from the same third state or
from different third states).212 Any non-chosen court may also exercise jurisdiction,
regardless of the domicile of the parties, as long as the choice of court agreement is null
and void as to its substantive validity under the law of the Member State of the chosen
court. Therefore, the changes from Article 17 of the 1968 Brussels Convention and Articles
23 of Brussels I Regulation to Article 25 of Brussels I Recast can be summarized as below:
One or more of the
parties is domiciled in a
Member State
None of the parties is
domiciled in a Member
State
The chosen
court
Under Article 17 of
the 1968 Brussels
Convention and
Article 23 of Brussels
I Regulation
It shall have
jurisdiction.
It can exercise
jurisdiction.
Under Article 25 of
Brussels I Recast
It shall have jurisdiction unless the agreement is
null and void as to its substantive validity under
the law of that Member State.
The
non-chosen
court
Under Article 17 of
the 1968 Brussels
Convention and
Article 23 of Brussels
I Regulation
It shall have no jurisdiction unless the chosen
court or courts has/have declined jurisdiction.
Under Article 25 of
Brussels I Recast
It can have jurisdiction when the agreement is
null and void as to its substantive validity under
the law of that Member State of the chosen court.
Brussels I Recast generally follows the rules of the 1968 Brussels Convention and Brussels
I Regulation, but there are obvious improvements in many details. In terms of choice of
court agreements, apart from parties’ domicile, other requirements or limits on choice of
court agreements will be examined below.
5.2 Severability
212 Matthias Weller (n 209) 96.
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Choice of court agreements are treated independently of the main contract. Article 25.5,
which concerns the severability of choice of court agreements, is a newly added rule in
Brussels I Recast. Although Article 25.5 is new, the essence of the rule is not new because
it codifies a point of the judgment of the ECJ,213 in the case Francesco Benincasa v
Dentalkit Srl.214 A choice of court agreement designating the courts at Florence was
distinguished from the main franchising contract performed in Munich because of their
different purposes and applicable laws, thus its validity must be distinguished from that of
the main franchising contract. Specifically, the choice of court agreement “serves a
procedural purpose”,215 while other substantive provisions of the main contract set the
rights and obligations of both parties. Therefore, a choice of court agreement shall be
treated independently of the main contract.
Article 25.5 follows the same approach as the corresponding rule (i.e. Article 3(d)) in the
2005 Hague Convention and provides that a choice of court agreement which forms part of
the main contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the
main contract.216 This means that the validity of a choice of court agreement should be
judged by its own conflict of laws rules. Furthermore, the validity of the agreement cannot
be contested solely on the ground that the main contract is not valid. As a result, an invalid
main contract will not necessarily lead to an invalid choice of court clause within the main
contract. When the main contract is invalidated, altered, cancelled or terminated for various
reasons, the choice of court agreement, as a special agreement for dispute resolution, is not
necessarily invalidated, altered, cancelled or terminated. The choice of court agreement
may be valid even if the main contract is not. Likewise, the choice of court agreement may
be invalid even if the main contract is effective.
Thus, the rule of severability effectively avoids creating uncertainties and “separates the
issues of the validity of a choice of court clause from the validity of the contract within
which the clause is found”.217 Even if the validity of the main contract is questioned, it
213 Vesna Lazić and Steven Stuij (eds) (n 211) 41.
214 Case C-269/95 Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl [1997] ECR I-3767.
215 ibid, para 25.
216 See part 4.2 in Chapter 4.
217 Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (4th edn,
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will not prevent a valid choice of court agreement from being recognized and enforced.
Thus, the chosen court still can exercise jurisdiction based on the valid choice of court
agreement and can adjudicate relative issues.
5.3 Applicable Law
Article 23 of Brussels I Regulation did not provide the applicable law for choice of court
agreements. Thus, the validity of a choice of court agreement was uncertain as it may be
valid in one Member State under its domestic rules, but invalid in another Member State
per Article 23. In the case law of the ECJ, the law applicable to choice of court agreements
was the domestic law of Member State of the seized court.218 For example in the case of
Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit,219 a choice of court agreement contained in the
statutes of a company limited by shares needed to be “adopted in accordance with the
provisions of the applicable national law” (German law).220
Article 1.2(e) of the Rome I Regulation excludes from the scope of the Regulation choice
of court agreements,221 and thus there is no uniform rule designating the substantive law
applicable to the validity of choice of court agreements under the Rome I Regulation.222
Article 25 of Brussels I Recast introduces a uniform conflict of laws rule for choice of
court agreements. Due to the principle of severability, the law applicable to a choice of
court agreement may be different from the contractual lex causae, the applicable law of the
main contract. Article 25.1 provides a clear choice of law rule applicable to the essential
validity of choice of court agreements. The chosen court or courts of a Member State shall
have presumed exclusive jurisdiction “unless the agreement is null and void as to its
substantive validity under the law of that Member State”. Therefore, the law of the State of
WGreen 2015) 167, para 7-42.
218 Richard Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 56, para
2.48; Louise Merrett, ‘Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation: A Comparative Code for Jurisdiction
Agreements?’ (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 545, 564.
219 Case C-214/89 Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit [1992] ECR I-1745.
220 ibid, para 21.
221 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L 177/6.
222 Lord Collins of Mapesbury and others (eds), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, vol 1
(15th edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2012) 603-604, para 12-103; Vesna Lazić and Steven Stuij
(eds) (n 211) 41.
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the chosen court governs the essential validity of the choice of court agreement, whereas
the essential validity of the main contract is governed by the lex causae under Article 3.1
of the Rome I Regulation. Also, as clarified in Recital 20 of Brussels I Recast, “the law of
that Member State” includes the conflict of laws rules of that Member State, thus this
harmonised conflict of laws rule can ensure a similar outcome on the case whatever the
court seised.223 As for formal validity, Articles 25.1 and 25.2 of Brussels I Recast set the
formal requirements for choice of court agreements,224 whereas the formal requirements of
the main contract are governed by the law designated by Article 11 of the Rome I
Regulation.225
5.4 Formal Validity
In terms of the formal validity of choice of court agreements, Article 17 of the 1968
Brussels Convention allowed a choice of court agreement to be agreed only ‘in writing or
evidenced in writing’:
If the Parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State, have, by
agreement in writing or by an oral agreement evidenced in writing, agreed that...226
In the following amendments, the formal requirements have been made more flexible and
easier to satisfy. ‘Practices in international trade or commerce’ was added into Article 17
by Article 11 of the 1978 Accession Convention,227 and the provision at that stage was:
...Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be either in writing or evidenced in
writing or, in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with practices
223 Andrew Bowen, ‘New Brussels I Regulation and Choice of Court Agreements’ (2014) 24 Scots Law
Times 99, 102.
224 See following part 5.4.
225 Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds) (n 205) 305, para 9.94.
226 Article 17 of 1968 Brussels Convention (n 207).
227 Convention of Accession of 9 October 1978 of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice
(78/884/EEC) [1978] OJ L 304/1.
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in that trade or commerce of which the parties are or ought to have been aware...228
Then ‘practices established between the parties’ was added into Article 17 by Article 7 of
the 1989 Accession Convention,229 and the provision at that stage was:
...Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be either:
(a) in writing or evidenced in writing, or
(b) in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established between
themselves, or
(c) in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which
the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is
widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved
in the particular trade or commerce concerned...230
This final version of three main formal requirements in the 1968 Brussels Convention is
maintained same by Article 23.1 of Brussels I Regulation and Article 25.1 of Brussels I
Recast. Firstly, a choice of court agreement shall be “in writing or evidenced in writing”;
secondly, the agreement can be “in a form which accords with practices which the parties
have established between themselves”; thirdly, the agreement can be “in international trade
or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which the parties are or ought to
have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely known to, and regularly
observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or commerce
concerned”. In addition, Article 23.2 of Brussels I Regulation and Article 25.2 of Brussels I
Recast treat “any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record” as
equal to a written choice of court agreement.
5.4.1 In Writing or Evidenced in Writing
228 Article 17 of Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters (Consolidated version) - 1968 Brussels Convention [1983] OJ C 97/2.
229 Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the Convention on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its
interpretation by the Court of Justice with the adjustments made to them by the Convention on the
accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the adjustments made to them by the Convention on the accession of the Hellenic
Republic (89/535/EEC) [1989] OJ L 285/1.
230 Article 17 of Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial
matters (Consolidated version) - 1968 Brussels Convention [1990] OJ C 189/2.
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It seems that any formal requirement of the above three options is easy for choice of court
agreements to satisfy in most commercial practices.231 However, the interpretation of the
formal requirements by the ECJ is relatively stricter in the first requirement of “in writing
or evidenced in writing”.232 For example, in the case of Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e
Gianmario Colzani s.n.c. v Ruwa Polsteimaschinen GmbH,233 the ECJ ruled that a choice
of court agreement, which is included among general conditions of sale printed on the back
of a contract, fulfills the requirement of writing only if the contract signed by both parties
contained an express reference to those general conditions.234 The express reference does
not need to “specifically refer to the presence” of a choice of court agreement in the earlier
offers,235 but shall be checked by a party exercising ‘reasonable care’.236 Hence, the
choice of court agreement will not satisfy the formal requirements if there is no reasonably
noticed reference or the reference is “only indirect or implied”.237
As for oral choice of court agreements evidenced in writing, the interpretation is also
usually strict, namely, an oral agreement merely incorporated by reference to a document
containing the choice of court agreement is not enough.238 For example, in the case of
Partenreederei ms. Tilly Russ and Ernest Russ v NV Haven- & Vervoerbedrijf Nova and NV
Goeminne Hout239 and F. Berghoefer GmbH & Co. KG v ASA SA,240 an oral agreement
must be expressly related to the choice of court and written confirmation of that agreement
by one of the parties must be received by the other and the latter must have raised no
objection.241 As a result, both elements are necessary: an oral choice of court agreement
and subsequent written confirmation by one of the parties. In the case of Saey Home &
Garden NV/SA v Lusavouga-Máquinas e Acessórios Industriais SA,242 a verbal agreement
231 Richard Fentiman (n 218) 67, para 2.82.
232 Lord Collins of Mapesbury and others (eds) (n 222) 623, para 12-135.
233 Case 24/76 Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e Gianmario Colzani s.n.c. v Ruwa Polsteimaschinen GmbH
[1976] ECR 1831.
234 ibid, para 10.
235 Geert Van Calster, European Private International Law (Hart Publishing 2013) 81.
236 Colzani (n 233), para 13.
237 Trevor Hartley, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe: The Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano
Convention, and the Hague Choice of Court Convention (Oxford University Press 2017) 245, para 13.63.
238 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (3rd edn, Edward Elgar 2014) 173.
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241 Tilly Russ (n 239), para 19; F. Berghoefer GmbH (n 240), para 16.
242 Case C-64/17 Saey Home & Garden NV/SA v Lusavouga-Máquinas e Acessórios Industriais SA [2018]
5 Choice of Court Agreements in the Brussels I Recast Regulation 72
without written confirmation was held not to satisfy the requirement of Article 25.243
In addition, a choice of court agreement concluded by electronic means shall be equivalent
to an agreement in writing by virtue of Article 25.2. That provision was included in Article
23.2 of Brussels I Regulation and is inspired by Article 9(1) and 10(3) of the ‘Directive on
Electronic Commerce’.244 The definition of “electronic communication” was taken from
Article 6(1) of the 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce.245 The key
element is that electronic communication can be durably stored so that it can be accessed
later, for example, emails, fax, telegram, and active web pages. The application of this
provision to internet sales is straightforward because the choice of court agreement can
appear on the screen in a form which can be printed and saved.246 In the case of Jaouad El
Majdoub v CarsOnTheWeb.Deutschland GmbH,247 the claimant submitted that the
webpage containing the defendant’s general terms and conditions of sale did not open
automatically upon every individual sale. Instead, a box with the indication ‘click here to
open the conditions of delivery and payment in a new window’ must be clicked on (‘click
wrapping’). Thus, the applicant argued that a choice of court agreement had not been
validly incorporated. However, the ECJ held that the method of accepting the general terms
and conditions of a contract for sale by ‘click-wrapping’ constitutes a communication by
electronic means which provides a durable record of the choice of court agreement because
“that method makes it possible to print and save the text of those terms and conditions
before the conclusion of the contract”.248 The purpose of Article 25.2 is to “treat certain
forms of electronic communications in the same way as written communications in order
OJ C 161/12
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1566170887401&uri=CELEX:62017CJ0064>
accessed 13 September 2019.
243 ibid, para 32.
244 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000]
OJ L 178/1.
245 UNCITRALModel Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment 1996 with additional article 5
bis as adopted in 1998 <https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_Ebook.pdf>
accessed 13 September 2019.
246 Trevor Hartley (n 237) 261, para 13.121.
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to simplify the conclusion of contracts by electronic means”,249 and the requirement of ‘in
writing or evidenced in writing’ should not invalidate a choice of court agreement
“concluded in a form that is not written on paper but accessible on screen”.250 It is possible
to save and print the choice of court agreement before concluding the contract so that the
fact that the webpage does not open automatically cannot “call into question the validity of
the agreement conferring jurisdiction”.251
5.4.2 Established Practices
For the second formal requirement, Article 25.1(b) refers to a choice of court agreement
that is “in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established between
themselves”. This wording is taken from Article 9(1) of the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention
(CISG),252 and it can be distinguished from Article 25.1(a) (namely, the requirement of
writing) because it “does not in principle require any writing at all”.253 To establish
practices, there should be consensus between the parties with sufficient certainty on the
choice of court agreement in their previous contracts and the parties should have been
concluding contracts “on a regular basis and in accordance with a certain practice”.254 All
of the parties are relying on the existence of these contracts based on the principle of good
faith. Continuous frequent trading relationships between the parties can justify the
existence of a bilaterally established practice. Bilaterally established practices require that
“the parties used to conduct their transactions regularly in a specific way” and that “this
practice had lasted a certain time”.255 If there has been a negotiation leading to a new
contract between the parties, or a substantial break in their trading relationships, the
“established practices” is broken and the previous choice of court agreement will not apply.
This requirement of “bilaterally established practices” is an independent concept used by
249 ibid, para 36.
250 ibid, para 35.
251 ibid, para 39.
252 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 11April 1980),
<https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf> accessed 13
September 2019.
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the ECJ in “interpreting the requirement of writing in the context of confirmatory
documents which were received without objection”.256 For example in the case of Galeries
Segoura SPRL v Societe Rahim Bonakdarian,257 a unilateral declaration in writing was
sufficient to constitute a choice of court agreement within the framework of a continuing
trading relationship,258 thus the written declaration formed a bilaterally established
practice. If “it is established that the dealings taken as a whole are governed by the general
conditions of the party giving the confirmation” containing a choice of court agreement, it
would be contrary to the principle of good faith for the recipient of the confirmation to
deny the existence of the choice of court agreement “even if he had given no acceptance in
writing”.259 The same outcome was reached in the case of Partenreederei ms. Tilly Russ
and Ernest Russ v NV Haven- & Vervoerbedrijf Nova and NV Goeminne Hout.260
5.4.3 Usages in International Trade or Commerce
As for the third option in Article 25.1(c) (a “form which accords with usages” in
international trade or commerce), the requirements vary on a case-by-case basis. Just like
the wording in that provision, whether the parties are or ought to have been aware of the
usage, and whether the usage is widely known to and regularly observed by parties in such
trade or commerce, are factual questions to be decided by the national court.261 In the case
of Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v Hugo Trumpy SpA,262 the ECJ held
that:
The existence of a usage, which must be determined in relation to the branch of trade
or commerce in which the parties to the contract operate, is established where a
particular course of conduct is generally and regularly followed by operators in that
256 Peter Stone (n 238) 174.
257 Case 25/76 Galeries Segoura SPRL v Societe Rahim Bonakdarian [1976] ECR 1851.
258 Trevor Hartley (n 237) 246, para 13.68.
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branch when concluding contracts of a particular type.263
“Usages in international trade or commerce” refers to repeated similar transactions in a
particular field of international trade.264 These transactions should be consistent with
previous agreements between the parties for the same contractual matters, and other parties
also adopt the similar doings regularly in other transactions. As a result, these similar
transactions may constitute usages in international trade or commerce. The courts of EU
Member States have discretion to determine whether the transaction accords with usages in
international trade or commerce, however, this discretion might lead to great uncertainty
because the parties may not foresee the result.
5.5 Essential Validity
Article 25 of Brussels I Recast does not regulate the essential validity of choice of court
agreements directly, but rather leaves it to the law of the Member State of the chosen court.
However, choice of court agreements need to satisfy some implied essential requirements
in Article 25, such as parties’ consensus and presumed exclusivity. In addition, there are
some limits on choice of court agreements pertaining to insurance matters, consumer
contracts and individual contracts of employment.
5.5.1 Consensus
Like contracts in civil and commercial law, it is the parties’ consensus that is the primary
requirement to make a choice of court agreement valid. The consensus is the ‘central
element’ for the validity of a choice of court agreement.265 The meeting of minds should
be authentic and the parties must be willing to be bound to the agreement. Consensus
between the parties must be “clearly and precisely demonstrated”.266 Although the formal
requirements are more flexible than before, they do not eliminate the need for consensus
263 ibid, para 30.
264 Lord Collins of Mapesbury and others (eds) (n 222) 626, para 12-138.
265 Ulrich Magnus and Peter Mankowski (eds) (n 210) 625, para 75.
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between the parties.267 If either formal requirement in Article 25 is satisfied, consensus
between the parties is assumed to exist.268
According to general rules, it remains possible for a choice of court agreement to be held
invalid “by reason of fraud, mistake or improper pressure”.269 In addition, the ECJ has
made it clear in Siegfried Zelger v Sebastiano Salinitri270 that Article 17 of the 1968
Brussels Convention dispenses with any requirement for an objective connection between
the dispute and the court designated.271 The same view has been affirmed in various
cases.272 Thus choosing a ‘neutral’ court is acceptable under Article 25. It is better to
choose a specific court and thus “pre-empt any problem of finding the territorially
appropriate court within the chosen State”.273 If the parties merely choose the courts of a
Member State in general, the court which shall be competent will be decided by the
internal law of that State.
Furthermore, consensus refers to the consensus of original parties rather than of any
successor to a party. When the main contract is transmitted to a third party, due to the
principle of party autonomy, the choice of court agreement in the main contract cannot be
transmitted automatically to the third party “unless the successor himself has agreed to the
choice of court clause”.274 This can also result from the principle of severability which
makes the choice of court agreement independent from the main contract. In the case of
Refcomp SpA v Axa Corporate Solutions Assurance SA and Others,275 the ECJ held that a
choice of court agreement cannot be transmitted to the third party automatically. The
agreement will not bind “a party to a subsequent contract and successor, in whole or in part,
to the rights and obligations of one of the parties to the initial contract”,276 unless that third
267 ibid, 292, para 9.51.
268 ibid.
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270 Case 56/79 Siegfried Zelger v Sebastiano Salinitri [1980] ECR 89.
271 ibid, para 4.
272 MSG (n 261), para 34; Francesco Benincasa (n 214), para 28; Trasporti (n 262), para 50.
273 Peter Stone (n 238) 184.
274 Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M Carruthers (n 217) 167, para 7-42.
275 C-543/10 Refcomp SpA v Axa Corporate Solutions Assurance SA and Others [2013] OJ C 108/2,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1566248772087&uri=CELEX:62010CJ0543>
accessed 13 September 2019.
276 ibid, para 25.
5 Choice of Court Agreements in the Brussels I Recast Regulation 77
party has agreed to accept the choice of court in person. The wording of Article 23.1 of
Brussels I Regulation did not indicate whether a choice of court agreement could be
“transmitted, beyond the circle of the parties to a contract, to a third party”.277 More
importantly, it is the consensus between the parties that justifies the jurisdiction of the
chosen court. As a result, the scope of Article 25.1 of Brussels I Recast is limited to “cases
in which the parties have ‘agreed’ on a court”.278
5.5.2 Exclusivity
The exclusive jurisdiction of the chosen court is defined in Article 17 of the 1968 Brussels
Convention, but too much effort was spent verifying whether or not the choice of court
agreements were exclusive. Article 23 of Brussels I Regulation contains a presumption of
exclusivity for the chosen court or courts of a Member State, but this presumption can be
rebutted if the parties agree otherwise. Therefore, if a choice of court agreement does not
clearly state whether it is exclusive or not and the parties have no agreement otherwise, the
choice of court agreement will be presumed to be exclusive. On the contrary, only if the
parties have agreed clearly on a non-exclusive choice of court agreement,279 will the
choice of court agreement be non-exclusive.280
Article 25 of Brussels I Recast keeps the same presumption of exclusivity, but this
exclusivity must “bow before the provisions of Articles 24 and 26”.281 It means that the
presumed exclusivity will be rebutted if the disputed matter falls within the scope of
Article 24 (exclusive jurisdiction) or 26 (submission by appearance). Since Article 25 is
based on the principle of party autonomy, it does not prevent parties from subsequently
concluding a further choice of court agreement that is in conflict with the earlier one.
Submission by appearance in Article 26, regarded as an implied choice of court, should
prevail over Article 25.282 In addition, the exclusive jurisdiction in Article 24 has priority
277 ibid.
278 ibid, para 26.
279 Ulrich Magnus and Peter Mankowski (eds) (n 210) 658, para 147.
280 See part 2.2.1 in Chapter 2.
281 Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M Carruthers (n 217) 168, para 7-43.
282 Peter Stone (n 238) 184.
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across the whole Brussels I Recast so that it prevails over prorogation of jurisdiction.283
The latter half part of Article 25.4 states that choice of court agreements shall have no legal
force “if the courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude have exclusive jurisdiction
by virtue of Article 24”.
5.5.3 Protection of the Weaker Party
With the development of ‘substantial fairness and justice’ in the field of private
international law, protection of the weaker party is attracting more attention and has
developed into a basic principle in private international law.284 In international trade and
commerce, situations when the rights and bargaining powers of the parties are not equal, or
possibly are disparate, are easily found. Choice of court agreements might only maintain
superficial equality between the parties. In fact, it is very likely that one party who has the
stronger bargaining power will force the weaker party to agree on a court which is
beneficial to the stronger party.285 Although the chosen court is not necessarily harmful to
the weaker party, the proceedings in it are possibly full of various obstacles, for example,
higher litigation costs, longer lawsuit time and difficult service of documents, etc. This
kind of choice of court cannot truly reflect the authentic intention of the weaker party,
which runs counter to the principle of party autonomy. Therefore, in order to realize
‘substantial fairness and justice’, both national laws and international regulations usually
give unique protection to the weaker party, either in the provisions directly or in the
legislative intention inferred from the texts.
Brussels I Recast inherits and develops the protection of the weaker party in the 1968
Brussels Convention and Brussels I Regulation. It focuses on three categories, namely,
insurance matters, consumer contracts and individual contracts of employment. In relation
to insurance, consumer and employment contracts, the weaker party refers respectively to
the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary of the insurance contract, the injured party; the
consumer; and the employee. They “should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more
283 Article 27 of Brussels I Recast (n 202).
284 Vesna Lazić and Steven Stuij (eds) (n 211) 68.
285 See part 2.2.2 in Chapter 2.
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favourable to his interests than the general rules”.286 As a result, the first part of Article
25.4 provides that choice of court agreements shall “have no legal force if they are contrary
to Article 15, 19 or 23”. It sets limitations on the capacity of the weaker party to “depart by
agreement from what is provided for their benefit” in the Brussels I Recast.287 It can be
seen that protection of the weaker party mainly concerns the timing of concluding choice
of court agreements and the scope of courts where the weaker party can bring proceedings.
Specifically, the choice of court agreement should be entered into after the dispute has
arisen; the choice of court agreement should allow the policyholder, the insured, a
beneficiary, the consumer and the employee to bring proceedings in courts other than those
indicated in those three Sections in Brussels I Recast (Section 3, 4 & 5). In the author’s
view, protecting the weaker party in insurance, consumer and employment contracts
reflects the comprehensiveness of the framework of the EU law.
5.6 Breach of Choice of Court Agreements
A choice of court agreement is usually honoured by the parties. However, a particular
situation, where concurrent proceedings may arise, needs to be satisfactorily dealt with
when there is an exclusive choice of court agreement. It is the situation “where a court not
chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement has been seised of proceedings and the
designated court is seised subsequently of proceedings involving the same cause of action
and between the same parties”.288 When proceedings involving the same cause of action
and between the same parties are brought before the courts of different Member States, the
non-chosen court may also have jurisdiction under the regulation. It is important to clarify
the ranking and priority of the jurisdictional rules in Brussels I Recast. The most logical
way of clarification is “the most specific and exclusive first”.289 The lis pendens rule in
Section 9 of Brussels I Recast solves conflicts of international jurisdiction and is intended
to avoid parallel proceedings in different Member States.290 It concerns the order and
operation of different articles and ensures that judgments can be enforced among the
286 Recital 18 of Brussels I Recast (n 202).
287 Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M Carruthers (n 217) 168, para 7-43.
288 Recital 22 of Brussels I Recast (n 202).
289 Geert Van Calster (n 235) 23.
290 Vesna Lazić and Steven Stuij (eds) (n 211) 2.
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Member States.
In the strict system of lis pendens rule under Brussels I Regulation, only the court first
seised could establish its own jurisdiction and any other court (including the chosen court)
was required to stay or decline jurisdiction.291 The jurisdiction of the court first seised
could be established “both generally and in light of argument that the parties had made an
exclusive choice of court in favour of another jurisdiction”,292 which was criticized for a
long time. It meant that the court designated by the parties needed to stay its proceedings if
another court had been seised first. The efficiency of choice of court agreements was
lowered and the rule enabled some claimants “acting in bad faith” to frustrate the exclusive
choice of court agreement by first seising a non-competent court.293 This possibility
destroyed the predictability and legal certainty of dispute resolution which choice of court
agreements should produce.294
It was the judgment of the ECJ in the case of Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl295 that
prioritised the lis pendens rule over choice of court agreements. This motivated the EU to
modify the lis pendens rule in Brussels I Regulation. An Austrian company “Gasser” and
an Italian company “MISAT” chose the Austrian courts in their contract (on the back of all
invoices). When the dispute arose between them, MISAT brought a lawsuit in a court in
Rome for a negative declaratory judgment (a declaration of non-liability) firstly in April
2000. In December 2000, Gasser initiated the proceedings for the payment of invoices in
the chosen Regional Court in Austria based on their choice of court agreement. In the end,
the ECJ decided that the Austrian court, even if it is chosen in the choice of court
agreement, must stay its proceedings until the first seised Italian court has declared that it
does not have jurisdiction, because the chosen court is seised later.296 This was the case
where the lis pendens rule applies rigidly. However, it might take a long time for the Italian
court to adjudicate its jurisdiction297 and it was more likely for the Italian court to decline
291 Articles 27-30 of Brussels I Regulation (n 203).
292 Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M Carruthers (n 217) 170, para 7-46.
293 Andrew Bowen (n 223) 102.
294 ibid.
295 Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693.
296 ibid, para 54.
297 Trevor Hartley (n 237) 388, para 23.04.
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its jurisdiction due to the fact that the Austrian court is the chosen court by parties. This
judgment showed that the principle of party autonomy could be overridden by other
principles. A party may purposely initiate proceedings in a “slow” court, which is highly
inefficient in the area of dispute resolution. A strict lis pendens rule is a good principle
based on mutual trust among Member States of the EU, but it ultimately makes the
principle of party autonomy “blocked or frozen”.298 Such rigid application of the lis
pendens rule was heavily criticized as “being abusive and hampering justice and trade”.299
Just like the negative declaratory judgment sought by MISAT in the Italian court, it is
unreasonable for a party to “seize the initiative by seising a forum in which to seek” a
negative declaration in order to escape a choice of court agreement,300 such as a
declaration of no capacity or non-liability, a declaration of no valid choice of court
agreement, a declaration of breach the main contract, and so on. These expected
declarations will breach the good faith between the parties and eventually ruin the social
justice. Fortunately, this situation has been corrected by Article 31.2 of Brussels I Recast.
According to Article 31.2, any court seised other than the one exclusively chosen should
stay its proceedings as soon as the chosen court has been seised and until the chosen court
declares that it has no jurisdiction under the choice of court agreement. The situation of
Article 31.3 follows that of Article 31.2, which provides that if the chosen court accepts
jurisdiction, any other court seised should decline jurisdiction. For the sake of the chosen
court, Article 31.2 adjusts the implied equality of courts and protects party autonomy more
effectively. According to Recital 22 of Brussels I Recast, this exception “enhances the
effectiveness of exclusive choice-of-court agreements” and “avoids abusive litigation
tactics”.301 When a party wants to seek a negative declaration in a non-chosen court in
breach of the choice of court agreement, his plan will fail because any non-chosen court
should stay or dismiss its proceedings in principle. Article 31.2 ensures the priority of the
chosen court. In addition, the chosen court should be able to proceed “irrespective of
whether the non-designated court has already decided on the stay of proceedings”.302
298 Vesna Lazić and Steven Stuij (eds) (n 211) 35.
299 ibid, 36.
300 Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M Carruthers (n 217) 181, para 7-59.
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Moreover, according to Article 31.4, there is an exception for insurance, consumer, and
employment contracts where the weaker parties are claimants and the choice of parties is
invalid based on Sections 3, 4, or 5 in Chapter 2 of Brussels I Recast. This provision
protects the interests of the weaker party in those three kinds of matters and allows them to
seek negative declarations in non-chosen courts. It is because the weaker party may be
forced by the stronger party to choose the designated court and it is very likely that the
interests of the weaker party may be damaged in the chosen court.
In summary, the lis pendens rule generally supports the jurisdiction of the court first seised.
When there is an exclusive choice of court agreement, the jurisdiction of the chosen court
should be respected over that of the court seised even if a court is the court first seised in
breach of the choice of court agreement. However, firstly, the exclusive jurisdiction in
Article 24 cannot be violated; it has the top priority among all of the jurisdiction rules in
Brussels I Recast. Then the special jurisdiction in Sections 3, 4 and 5 should not be
violated. Submission by appearance in Article 26 can also prevail over the jurisdiction of
the chosen court, which means that a court seised in breach of a valid choice of court
agreement will be the competent court if the defendant enters an appearance without
contesting its jurisdiction. After having checked all the above, the jurisdiction of the
chosen court can be respected and the lis pendens rule will not apply.
5.7 Conclusion
The Brussels Regime, from the 1968 Brussels Convention to the Brussels I Regulation and
the current Brussels I Recast, respects the principle of party autonomy and secures the
validity of choice of court agreements in order to ensure legal certainty. With regard to the
severability, applicable law and formal validity of choice of court agreements, Article 25 of
Brussels I Recast takes a similar approach to the rules of the 2005 Hague Convention. In
addition, the formal requirements in Article 25 are more flexible. To sum up, considering
its advantages and disadvantages, Article 25 is a good example of a legislative rule for
choice of court agreements. It efficiently coordinates the allocation of jurisdiction between
the chosen court and non-chosen courts. The relationship between Brussels I Recast and
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the 2005 Hague Convention will be discussed in the next chapter, as will be the UK’s
attitude to Brussels I Recast and the 2005 Hague Convention under the influence of Brexit.
Finally, whether or not Article 25 of Brussels I Recast is a good model for Chinese law will
also be examined.
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6 Comparison and Conclusion
6.1 The Relationship between the 2005 Hague Convention and Brussels I Recast
6.1.1 Comparing the 2005 Hague Convention and Brussels I Recast
As examined in Chapters 4 and 5, the provisions concerning choice of court agreements in
the 2005 Hague Convention and Brussels I Recast have something in common, especially
the mirror rules about severability and applicable law. Only two possible incompatibilities
between the two instruments are pointed out by the Explanatory Report: the lis pendens
rule (under Brussels I Regulation) and the insurance rules.303 However, due to the new lis
pendens rule modified in Brussels I Recast and the declaration made by the EU with regard
to insurance contracts, actually there are almost no incompatibilities between the two
instruments concerning choice of court agreements and “the risk of a true conflict between
the two instruments is marginal”.304 Both instruments can be regarded as a valuable model
of legislation, aiming to ensure the validity of choice of court agreements at an
international level.
The 2005 Hague Convention establishes jurisdiction from the perspective of the chosen
court and the non-chosen court. It is relatively easy for either the chosen court or any
non-chosen court to determine the validity of a choice of court agreement. However, the
Convention is limited to exclusive choice of court agreements in international civil and
commercial situations and excludes from its scope many kinds of subject matters. In
addition, the geographic scope of the 2005 Hague Convention is limited.305 It is hard to
say that the 2005 Hague Convention, in practice or reality, is a global convention because
303 Permanent Bureau of the Conference, Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (Text
adopted by the Twentieth Session), Explanatory Report by Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi (HCCH
Publications 2013) 95, para 295, <https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl37final.pdf> accessed 13 September
2019.
304 Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds), The Brussels I Regulation Recast (Oxford University Press 2015)
284, para 9.25.
305 Giesela Rühl, ‘Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters after Brexit: Which Way Forward?’
(2018) 67(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 99, 127.
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it is currently in force only within the EU, Mexico, Montenegro and Singapore.306 As a
result, there is little experience with the workings of the Convention in legal practice.307
Only one litigated case under the 2005 Hague Convention can be found so far.308 However,
one should hold an optimistic view about the future of the Convention that it will attract an
increasing number of accession States.
Brussels I Recast, as a regional instrument, seems to have “achieved perfect coherence on a
formal level”.309 Some important changes concerning the rules dealing with choice of
court agreements have been introduced by Brussels I Recast. In order to enhance the
validity of choice of court agreements, Article 25 adopts a unique approach to the concept
of choice of court agreements and gives “less judicial discretion on whether or not to hear a
case”.310 But there are still some questions remaining unsolved. One is that there is no
direct conflict of laws rule in Brussels I Recast to determine the substantive validity of
choice of court agreements, so that the approach of renvoi may be applied in every case,
but the conflict of laws rule may vary from Member State to Member State.311 The other
question is that there is no specific rule for complex choice of court agreements,312 such as
asymmetric or unilateral agreements, harlequin agreements, non-specific agreements and
hybrid agreements referred in part 2.2, above.
The relationship between the 2005 Hague Convention and Brussels I Recast is managed by
Article 26 of the Convention. According to Article 26.6, the 2005 Hague Convention “shall
306 Updated list of Contracting States to the Hague Convention
<https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98> accessed 13 September 2019.
307 Giesela Rühl (n 305) 128.
308 In June 2018, the High Court of Singapore granted the Enforcement Application for a judgment of the
English High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, under the framework of the 2005 Hague
Convention, which is the first judgment to be enforced under the 2005 Hague Convention.
<https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=6616&dtid=55> accessed 13 September
2019.
309 Matthias Weller, ‘Choice of Court Agreements under Brussels Ia and under the Hague Convention:
Coherences and Clashes’ (2017) 13(1) Journal of Private International Law 91, 101.
310 Jonas Steinle and Evan Vasiliades, ‘The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements under the Brussels I
Regulation: Reconsidering the Principle of Party Autonomy’ (2010) 6(3) Journal of Private International
Law 565, 587.
311 Mónica Herranz Ballesteros, ‘The Regime of Party Autonomy in the Brussels I Recast: The Solutions
Adopted for Agreements on Jurisdiction’ (2014) 10(2) Journal of Private International Law 291, 308;
Quim Forner-Delaygua, ‘Changes to Jurisdiction Based on Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements under the
Brussels I Regulation Recast’ (2015) 11(3) Journal of Private International Law 379, 399.
312 Mónica Herranz Ballesteros (n 311) 308.
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not affect the application of the rules of a Regional Economic Integration Organization that
is a Party to this Convention, whether adopted before or after this Convention”.313 The EU
is regarded as a Regional Economic Integration Organization when it acceded to the 2005
Hague Convention, so that generally the application of Brussels I Recast between EU
Member States is not influenced by the Convention. At the same time, Article 26.1
provides that the 2005 Hague Convention “shall be interpreted so far as possible to be
compatible with other treaties in force for Contracting States, whether concluded before or
after this Convention”.314 In cases where both parties are residents of EU Member States,
the Convention gives precedence to Brussels I Recast.
Furthermore, as provided in Article 26.2, the 2005 Hague Convention “shall not affect the
application by a Contracting State of a treaty, whether concluded before or after this
Convention, in cases where none of the parties is resident in a Contracting State that is not
a Party to the treaty”.315 This means that Brussels I Recast, rather than the 2005 Hague
Convention, is applied in cases where one party is resident in an EU Member State and the
other party is a resident in a third State which is not a Contracting State to the 2005 Hague
Convention.316 The 2005 Hague Convention is applied only in cases where one party is
resident in an EU Member State and the other party is resident in a third State which is a
Contracting State to the Convention. These third States currently include Mexico,
Montenegro and Singapore.317 The rationale of this rule is that when one party is resident
in a Contracting State to the 2005 Hague Convention which is not an EU Member State,
that State “has an interest” in the prevailing operation of the Convention.318 For example, a
choice of court agreement between an EU firm and a Singaporean firm, choosing the
courts in France, will be governed by the 2005 Hague Convention.
6.1.2 The Influence of Brexit
313 Article 26.6 of the 2005 Hague Convention.
314 Article 26.1 of the 2005 Hague Convention.
315 Article 26.2 of the 2005 Hague Convention.
316 Elizabeth B Crawford and Janeen M Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (4th edn,
W Green 2015) 173, para 7-50.
317 Updated list of Contracting States to the 2005 Hague Convention (n 306).
318 Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report (n 305) 91, para 273; Andrew Dickinson and
Eva Lein (eds) (n 304) 284, para 9.24.
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In accordance with Article 29 of the 2005 Hague Convention, the UK is bound by the
Convention by virtue of its membership of the EU, which approved the 2005 Hague
Convention on behalf of its Member States.319 The ongoing uncertainty pertaining to
Brexit may lead to complex situations in applying the 2005 Hague Convention or Brussels
I Recast. The uncertainty will exist until Brexit is effected and the terms of any future
relationship between the UK and the EU are agreed, between UK parties and parties who
are resident in a Contracting State to the 2005 Hague Convention which is not an EU
Member State.
The Government of the UK and the European Council reached political agreement on the
withdrawal of the UK from the EU, but the “Brexit Withdrawal Agreement” has not been
approved by the UK Parliament.320 This has delayed the process of Brexit. The original
Brexit Withdrawal Agreement includes provisions for a transition period from 30 March
2019 to 31 December 2020 or such later date as may be agreed by the UK and the EU. In
accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement, during the transition period, the UK would
still be treated as a Member State of the EU for the purposes of international agreements
concluded by the EU,321 including the 2005 Hague Convention. As a result, EU law,
including the 2005 Hague Convention, would continue to apply to and in the UK.322
However, the above is the simple situation when the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement is
ratified by the approval of the UK Parliament. It is very likely, as matters currently stand,
that the UK will leave the EU with no agreement concerning international treaties. The
2005 Hague Convention may cease to apply to and in the UK if a “No Deal” scenario
319 Declaration of succession from the EU
<https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/notifications/?csid=1044&disp=resdn>
accessed 13 September 2019.
320 On 15 January 2019, the House of Commons rejected the Withdrawal Agreement by a vote of 432 to 202.
The Agreement was rejected again on 12 March 2019 by the House of Commons on a vote of 391 to 242,
and it was rejected a third time on 29 March 2019 by 344 votes to 286. See “Brexit withdrawal agreement”
from Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brexit_withdrawal_agreement> accessed 13 September
2019.
321 Declarations from the UK and Notice from the Depositary
<https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/notifications/?csid=1318&disp=resdn>
accessed 13 September 2019.
322 ibid.
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became a reality.323 In order to ensure continuity of application of the Convention in the
UK from the point at which it ceases to be a Member State of the EU, the UK submitted an
Instrument of Accession in accordance with Article 27(4) of the 2005 Hague Convention
on 28 December 2018, in preparation for this situation.324 The Instrument of Accession
declares that the UK accedes to the 2005 Hague Convention in its own right with effect
from 1 April 2019. The UK intends to continue to participate in the 2005 Hague
Convention after it withdraws from the EU and this declaration illustrates that the UK had
signed and ratified the 2005 Hague Convention on 28 December 2018.325 By doing this,
the UK seems to have reduced the potential “inapplicable” gap to two days (30 and 31
March 2019). On the contrary, in the event that the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement had been
signed, ratified and approved by the UK and the EU and entered into force on 30 March
2019, the UK would have withdrawn the Instrument of Accession.326 In that case, during
the transition period as stated above, the UK would have been continuously treated as a
Member State of the EU and the 2005 Hague Convention would have continued to have
effect accordingly.327
Following the delayed Brexit date of 31 October 2019, agreed by the European Council,
the UK has a further extension of the period for withdrawal from the EU. During the
extension period, the UK will remain a Member State of the EU.328 As a result, EU law,
including the 2005 Hague Convention, will remain applicable to and in the UK. In order to
keep consistency, the UK’s accession to the 2005 Hague Convention has been suspended to
1 November 2019 according to the UK’s new declaration.329 Likewise, if the Brexit
Withdrawal Agreement is signed, ratified and approved by the UK and the EU, the UK will
withdraw the Instrument of Accession submitted on 28 December 2018.
323 Tobias Lutzi, ‘UK Ratifies Hague Choice of Court and Hague Maintenance Conventions’
(Conflictoflaws.net, 3 January 2019)
<http://conflictoflaws.net/2019/uk-ratifies-hague-choice-of-court-and-hague-maintenance-conventions/>
accessed 13 September 2019.
324 Declarations from the UK and Notice from the Depositary (n 321).
325 Updated list of Contracting States to the 2005 Hague Convention (n 306).
326 Declarations from the UK and Notice from the Depositary (n 321).
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Importantly, the 2005 Hague Convention was ratified by the UK only for the event that
there is no withdrawal agreement between the UK and the EU. No matter what transpires,
the 2005 Hague Convention will apply in cases where one party is resident in the UK and
the other party is resident in a third State which is a Contracting State to the Convention. In
cases between one UK party and another party from an other EU Member State, things
may be complex from 31 October 2019. Before 31 October 2019, Brussels I Recast will
continue to apply between the UK and other EU Member States. From 1 November 2019,
if there is a ratified Brexit Withdrawal Agreement, Brussels I Recast will still be applicable
during any transition period and then the 2005 Hague Convention will apply after the
transition period. If the “No Deal” scenario should become a reality from 1 November
2019, the 2005 Hague Convention will apply directly between the UK and other EU
Member States.
6.2 The Relationship between Chinese Law and the 2005 Hague Convention
6.2.1 Political Considerations
Although China signed the 2005 Hague Convention on 12 September 2017, it has not yet
ratified it. For China, it has been a great step forward to sign the 2005 Hague Convention,
but there are still various elements to consider before ratification. Firstly, the special
political system of China is an important and unique element to examine. Considering the
special Chinese situation of “one country, two systems, three legal traditions and four legal
regions”, general private international law rules cannot be applied simply. China has a
constitutional framework of “one country, two systems” between Mainland China, Hong
Kong and Macao. Hong Kong has inherited common law traditions from the UK and
Macao continues to use the Portuguese civil law system.330 Mainland China is also
strongly influenced by the civil law tradition, but has a communist legal system.331 As for
330 Jin Huang and Andrew Xuefeng Qian, ‘“One Country, Two Systems,” Three Law Families, and Four
Legal Regions: The Emerging Inter-Regional Conflicts of Law in China’ (1995) 5(2) Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law 289, 295.
331 Jie (Jeanne) Huang, ‘The Partially Modernized Chinese Conflicts System: Achievements and Challenges:
Review of Zheng Sophia Tang, Yongping Xiao, and Zhengxin Huo, Conflict of Laws in the People’s
Republic of China’ (2017) 13(3) Journal of Private International Law 633, 642.
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Taiwan, it is politically separated from Mainland China due to some historical issues, but
also belongs to the civil law system. Therefore, Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao and
Taiwan are four legal regions. China has its own domestic inter-regional conflict of laws
rules between Mainland China and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, respectively. When
ratifying the 2005 Hague Convention, China must consider the relationships between and
among these four legal regions.
It is helpful to consider the status of other Hague Conference conventions to which China
is a Contracting State. The People’s Republic of China is a Contracting State party to three
conventions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.332 Although these
three conventions also apply in Hong Kong and Macao, there are another five conventions
and another six conventions which have been extended by the UK and Portugal to the
Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao respectively.333 With regard to
the three main conventions applying in China, the 1993 Hague Protection of Children
Convention (Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption) is a good example to consider when predicting the
status of the 2005 Hague Convention for China because it is the only convention which
was ratified after China restored Hong Kong and Macao;334 both of the other conventions
entered into force in Hong Kong and Macao before China acceded to them. It is just like
the current situation. After fully considering the benefits and drawbacks, it took almost five
years for China to ratify the 1993 Hague Protection of Children Convention, from
signature on 30 November 2000 to ratification on 16 September 2005. At the same time,
some reservations were declared in regard to the law of Hong Kong and Macao. Similarly
for the 2005 Hague Convention, it is likely that it may take some years for China to ratify
it. At the same time, China may make certain declarations to the law of Hong Kong and
Macao if needed.
6.2.2 Commercial Considerations
332 “HCCH Members: China, People’s Republic of”
<https://www.hcch.net/en/states/hcch-members/details1/?sid=30> accessed 13 September 2019.
333 ibid.
334 Updated list of Contracting States to the 1993 Hague Protection of Children Convention
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Apart from these political considerations, there are also some commercial elements to take
into consideration in regard to the relationship between Chinese law and the 2005 Hague
Convention. From a commercial perspective, the global economy is being greatly
promoted by the Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”),335 a development strategy proposed by
the Chinese government on 28 March 2015 to focus on connectivity and cooperation
among Eurasian countries.336 The BRI initially focuses on infrastructure investment and is
estimated to be one of the largest infrastructure and investment projects in history, covering
65% of the world’s population and 40% of the global GDP.337 Up to 30 April 2019, China
has signed 187 cooperation documents with 131 countries and 30 international
organizations to build BRI.338 The BRI is “a bid to enhance regional connectivity and
embrace a brighter future” by the Chinese government.339 It has the potential to accelerate
economic growth across the Asia Pacific area and Central and Eastern Europe. Along with
the establishment of the Silk Road Fund340 and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB),341 there have been and will continue to be rapidly increasing international
commercial relationships between Chinese parties and parties from other BRI countries. At
the same time, the ability of Chinese parties to participate in international commercial and
investment matters has increased. As a result, this commercial development will inevitably
lead to a growing number of civil and commercial disputes. Apart from seeking resolution
335 The initiative was released by Xi Jinping in late 2013 and was subsequently promoted by Premier Li
Keqiang during state visits to Asia and Europe. The initiative was known as the One Belt and One Road
Initiative (OBOR) before and quickly became the most frequently mentioned concept in the official
newspaper People’s Daily in China. See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative>
accessed 13 September 2019.
336 Xinhua News Agency, ‘China unveils action plan on Belt and Road Initiative’ (The State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, 28 March 2015)
<http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/03/28/content_281475079055789.htm> accessed 13
September 2019.
337 Charlie Campbell, ‘China Says It’s Building the New Silk Road. Here Are Five Things to Know Ahead of
a Key Summit’ (Time, 12 May 2017)
<http://time.com/4776845/china-xi-jinping-belt-road-initiative-obor/> accessed 13 September 2019.
338 BRI countries <https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/gbjg/gbgk/77073.htm> accessed 13 September 2019.
339 Xinhua News Agency (n 336).
340 The Silk Road Fund is a state owned investment fund of the Chinese government aimed at fostering
increased investment in BRI countries. Silk Road Fund Co., Ltd. was established in Beijing on 29
December 2014 with investment from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, China Investment
Corporation, China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China. See
<http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23775/23767/index.html> accessed 13 September 2019.
341 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a multilateral development bank that was established
on 29 June 2015 and is dedicated to lending to infrastructure projects, in order to improve social and
economic outcomes in Asia and beyond. See <https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.html> accessed 13
September 2019.
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through arbitration, these disputes may also be brought before state courts when choice of
court agreements or other bases of jurisdiction exist.
For Chinese parties, especially investors in China, China’s joining the 2005 Hague
Convention is a welcome demonstration of integrating China into the global economy and
supporting the BRI. However, after signing the 2005 Hague Convention, whether to ratify
it and when to ratify it are still controversial issues amongst Chinese scholars and
practitioners. Some scholars argue that there are difficulties for the Chinese government in
ratifying the Convention and there will be some potential negative influences on China’s
economy and Chinese parties after the ratification. For instance, China’s status as a
developing country has not fundamentally changed, nor has the relatively weaker status of
Chinese parties in international commercial transactions.342 As a result, premature
ratification to some extent would neglect Chinese state interests and could lead to the loss
of essential fairness for Chinese parties,343 which would negatively influence China’s
economy and Chinese parties. Therefore, it is likely that China will wait for a
commercially optimal, later time to ratify the 2005 Hague Convention.
On the contrary, other scholars argue that ratifying the 2005 Hague Convention as soon as
possible will contribute to the promotion of the BRI and will meet the needs of establishing
two international commercial courts in China.344 To adjudicate international commercial
cases, two international commercial courts were established by the Supreme People’s
Court of China (SPC) on 29 June 2018.345 The purpose of these two courts is to try
international commercial cases in a fair and timely manner, to protect the lawful rights and
interests of Chinese and foreign parties equally, and to create a stable, fair, transparent and
convenient rule of law within the international business environment.346 The establishment
342 Jiwen Wang, ‘Discussion on Timing of Ratifying The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements’ (2018) 2 Wuhan University International Law Review 105, 110.
343 Yongping Xiao, ‘An Analysis of the Ratification of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and
China’s Countermeasures’ (2017) 5 Wuhan University International Law Review 1, 6-7.
344 Jiwen Wang (n 342) 114.
345 The First International Commercial Court is situated in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, and the Second
International Commercial Court in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province. The Fourth Civil Division of SPC is
responsible for coordinating and guiding the two international commercial courts.
346 Introduction of China International Commercial Court
<http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/193/195/index.html> accessed 13 September 2019.
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of these two international commercial courts will help strengthen China’s judicial
cooperation with the BRI countries and will make it easier to recognize and enforce
judgments from Chinese courts.347 Moreover, if China should ratify the 2005 Hague
Convention in the near future, this ratification would set a good example and attract more
countries to sign the Convention, especially the BRI countries,348 which would help
broaden the international influence of the 2005 Hague Convention and realise its purpose.
It can be predicted that when Chinese judgments fall within the scope of the 2005 Hague
Convention, China’s ratification would facilitate the recognition and enforcement of those
judgments, as well as the settlement of international commercial disputes. Therefore, in
this author’s view, considering commercial factors, China will finally ratify the 2005
Hague Convention, in order to provide clear guidance on settling international commercial
disputes concerning choice of court agreements with BRI countries, especially those which
are presently Contracting States to the 2005 Hague Convention including Singapore,
Montenegro and some EU Member States that are also BRI countries.349 When China
ratifies the 2005 Hague Convention, recognized international rules will be applied in
disputes concerning choice of court agreements, which would provide parties with more
certainty and would contribute to increased commercial activities between China and other
foreign countries.
6.2.3 Legal Considerations
The most difficult obstacle to China’s ratification of the 2005 Hague Convention is the
conflict between the two legal regimes. As examined in Chapter 3, Article 34 of the
Chinese Civil Procedure Law not only does not clarify the legal nature of choice of court
agreements (procedural or contractual), but also does not clarify the severability of choice
of court agreements. In addition, the applicable law for choice of court agreements is not
provided for in Chinese law, which brings vagueness and uncertainty in determining the
347 Tao Du, ‘The Legal Issues and Countermeasure of China’s Ratification of the Hague Convention on
Choice of Court Agreements’ (2016) 4 Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy & Social Sciences) 88, 90.
348 Jiwen Wang (n 342) 114; Tao Du (n 347) 90.
349 i.e. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Checked from BRI countries (n
338) and Updated list of Contracting States to the 2005 Hague Convention (n 306).
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validity of choice of court agreements. Applying the lex fori in Chinese judicial practice is
not the same as applying the law of the chosen court of the State in the 2005 Hague
Convention. As for the formal validity of choice of court agreements, Chinese law does not
list the different forms of “writing”, and does not adopt a wider wording such as Article 3(c)
of the 2005 Hague Convention.350 The most different aspect of Chinese law is the need to
consider the substantial connection between the chosen court and the dispute when
determining a validity of choice of court agreement.351 Although it is not very common
that there are other places having substantial connections besides the five listed places in
Article 34,352 this kind of legislative approach for essential validity (direct listing) is still
open to question.
From the perspective of recognition and enforcement of judgments, a domestic court is
sometimes reluctant to enforce foreign judgments, partly due to concerns about judicial
sovereignty.353 This, to some extent, has hindered effective international judicial
cooperation. Recognition and enforcement of judgments not only means the recognition of
judicial authority in foreign countries, but also directly affects the protection of parties’
rights and interests. When a judgment is given, if it cannot be recognized and enforced, the
judgment cannot be realised. As a result, the proper rights and interests of parties cannot be
protected, and the security of international transactions cannot be guaranteed. When a party
seeks to enforce a judgment in a foreign country, the court addressed firstly will determine
the validity of the choice of court agreement. After the court addressed makes a positive
decision, the judgment can be recognized and enforced successfully. The recognition and
enforcement of judgments is also an important aspect of international judicial
cooperation.354 If foreign judgments can be recognized and enforced smoothly, the
international circulation of judgments can be realised. Only by resolving the free
350 See part 4.4 in Chapter 4.
351 Mei Zhang, ‘Theories on China’s accession to the feasibility and necessity of Convention on Choice of
Court Agreement’ (2017) 1 Journal of Political Science and Law 139, 144.
352 See part 3.5.2 in Chapter 3.
353 Dan Song, ‘Web alert - China signs The Hague Choice of Court Convention - A step towards international
judicial cooperation’ (The Standard Club, 31 January 2018)
<https://www.standard-club.com/news-and-knowledge/latest-updates/2018/01/web-alert-china-signs-the-h
ague-choice-of-court-convention-a-step-towards-international-judicial-cooperation.aspx> accessed 13
September 2019.
354 Giesela Rühl (n 305) 99.
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circulation of judgments on a global scale will parties be encouraged to choose litigation
instead of arbitration.355 In addition, as an important achievement of the Hague
Conference “Judgments Project” since 1992,356 the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention
has been finalised.357 Under the 2019 Hague Convention, choice of court agreements can
be regarded as a base for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Article 5.1(e)).
The increasing attraction of the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention is likely to provide a
motivation for China to ratify the 2005 Hague Convention.
Although in China the National People’s Congress has not approved the 2005 Hague
Convention, some Chinese courts have already made decisions that take into account
certain provisions of that Convention. For example, in Cathay United Bank Co., Ltd. v.
Chao Gao, the Shanghai High Court took into account Article 3 of the 2005 Hague
Convention and decided that choice of court agreements should be exclusive unless the
parties stated otherwise, thus declining jurisdiction in favour of a Taiwanese Court.358
Article 3 of the 2005 Hague Convention is also referred to in several other similar cases in
explaining the exclusivity of choice of court agreements.359
If the 2005 Hague Convention enters into force in China, Chinese courts will be able to
apply the Convention directly and Chinese judgments can be recognized and enforced
within all the Contracting States. In order to attract more cases and exercise jurisdiction
more widely, Chinese courts will be more motivated to improve judicial efficiency and
ensure judicial justice. It is helpful to strengthen the litigation expectations of Chinese
parties and, in turn, positively impact the development of international business between
355 Tao Du (n 347) 89; Guojian Xu, ‘To Establish an International Legal System for Global Circulation of
Court Judgments: Legislative Materials and Comments on Proposed Draft Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ (2017) 5 Wuhan University International Law Review 100, 100.
356 The Judgments Project <https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments> accessed 13
September 2019.
357 Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or
Commercial Matters.
358 Shanghai High People’s Court, [2016] Hu Min Xia Zhong No. 99.
359 Standard Chartered Bank (China) Co., Ltd. v. Changshu Xingyu Xinxing Building Materials Co., Ltd.,
Jiangsu Province High People’s Court, [2010] Su Shang Wai Zhong Zi No. 0052; Guangzhou Xingji Film
Co., Ltd. v. Xinghao Entertainment Co., Ltd., Guangdong Province High People’s Court, [2016] Yue Min
Xia Zhong No. 312;May Delight Ltd., Good Prosper Holdings Ltd., Total Fortune Investments Ltd., and
Long Life International (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. v. Fulai International (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., Shanghai High
People’s Court, [2017] Hu Min Xia Zhong No. 96; Shanzheng International Securities Co., Ltd. v. Kai
YANG, Supreme People’s Court, [2018] Gui Gao Fa Min Xia Zhong No. 28.
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China and BRI countries. Therefore, in this author’s view, China ought to take steps to
ratify the 2005 Hague Convention in order specifically to enhance judicial coordination
with countries which are both EU Member States and BRI countries.
6.2.4 The Future of Chinese Law in This Area
6.2.4.1 Article 25 of Brussels I Recast as a Model for China?
As examined in Chapters 3 and 5, Chinese law is different to Article 25 of Brussels I
Recast in regards to choice of court agreements. Article 25 of Brussels I Recast is a rule
allocating jurisdiction among EU Member States. The lis pendens rule in Brussels I Recast
emphasises the jurisdiction of the court first seised despite the exception in Article 31(2).
Brussels I Recast can be a valuable model of legislation for any Regional Economic
Integration Organization. But for China, is Article 25 a valuable model to follow?
The author’s view is that as China is a single country, it is not a valuable model for Chinese
domestic law to follow Article 25 of Brussels I Recast. China can be seen only as a single
country rather than a Regional Economic Integration Organization like the EU, which
means that its national law can be more direct and specific rather than coordinating
jurisdiction among Member States. More importantly, considering Chinese special political
situation of “one country, two systems”, it is wise to consider that the approach of Article
25 of Brussels I Recast may be modified to adapted for the use among the four legal
regions in China. But it is not a valuable model for Article 34 of the 2017 Chinese CPL to
follow. Therefore, although Chinese law may borrow the rule of severability and formal
validity from Article 25 of Brussels I Recast, Article 25 is not a valuable model for Chinese
law.
6.2.4.2 Modify or Accede?
Although China revised its Civil Procedure Law on 27 June 2017, no changes were
introduced in the area of jurisdiction and there are still some differences between the
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Chinese CPL and the 2005 Hague Convention with respect to choice of court agreements.
According to Article 260 of the Chinese CPL, “if an international treaty concluded or
acceded to by the People’s Republic of China contains provisions that differ from that of
this law, the provisions of the international treaty shall apply, except those on which China
has made reservations.”360 Therefore, it could be concluded that, if China should accede to
the 2005 Hague Convention in the future, it does not need to modify its provisions on
choice of court agreements in the Chinese CPL to coincide with the Convention. If the
2005 Hague Convention were to become effective within China, it would be directly
applied in civil and commercial cases. But considering the significance of substantial
connection in Chinese law,361 it is very likely that China would make reservations about
the requirement of substantial connection when China ratifies the 2005 Hague Convention.
In some cases in the past, China amended its domestic law in harmony with an
international treaty before it ratified or acceded to the treaty.362 In the period when China
does not ratify the 2005 Hague Convention, there are some recommendations from this
author’s view to deal with the conflict rules and to enhance Chinese law. Firstly, the
severability and applicable law for choice of court agreements can be added into Article 34.
It will be good to allow parties to choose a separate applicable law for choice of court
agreements and the law of the chosen court of the state will be applied when the parties do
not choose the separate applicable law. Furthermore, it will be essential to follow the
relaxed trend of formal requirements for choice of court agreements. Finally, it is important
to add the protection of the weaker party for insurance, consumer and employment matters,
as Brussels I Recast does.
6.3 Conclusion
Based on the principle of party autonomy, choice of court agreements are playing an
increasingly positive and important role in international civil and commercial law. After
360 Translated Article 260 of the 2017 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China
<http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=d33df017c784876fbdfb&lib=law> accessed 13 September 2019.
361 See part 3.5.2 in Chapter 3.
362 Zheng Sophia Tang, ‘Effectiveness of Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses in the Chinese Courts—A Pragmatic
Study’ (2012) 61(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 459, 483.
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examining the basic features of choice of court agreements, this thesis has reviewed the
different rules that apply in three legal regimes: Chinese law, the 2005 Hague Convention
and Brussels I Recast. They are different from each other, but also have something in
common. Each regime’s rules concerning choice of court agreements have their own
benefits and drawbacks. The examined aspects of choice of court agreements in the three
regimes include severability, applicable law, formal validity and essential validity, as well
as the remedies for breach of choice of court agreements.
The examination of Chinese law and Chinese judicial practice concerning choice of court
agreements has shown some interesting discoveries. Chinese courts have used discretion to
decide the validity of choice of court agreements when the legislation is lacking or
outdated. This kind of flexibility can generate reasonable judgments in practice, but also
can lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results. Therefore, Chinese law needs to be
improved and consistent guidance needs to be provided. “The reform requires a review of a
broad range of issues”.363 The 2005 Hague Convention and Brussels I Recast are
“self-standing instruments in their respective normative contexts”,364 and both of them are
not perfect. Although the attitude of the Chinese legislative body is hard to predict,365 it is
not enough for China only to ratify the 2005 Hague Convention. Becoming a Contracting
State to the Convention will not solve the problem once for all. There may be more to learn
from those two instruments for China to improve its laws about choice of court agreements.
China is playing an increasingly important role in international trade and economy, as well
as in international judicial cooperation. China’s signing the 2005 Hague Convention has
been a great step forward in international judicial cooperation. Although it is hard to
predict when ratification may take place, such a change is only a matter of time. We should
hold a positive view that China will definitely be more engaged in international civil and
commercial matters, and that it will move from isolation to cooperation, following the
international trend.
363 ibid, 484.
364 Matthias Weller (n 309) 129.
365 Zheng Sophia Tang (n 362) 483.
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